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Digital lending has become an important trend in increasing financial access to Kenyans who 
need access to short term finances. The expansion of technological options in the country has 
seen the proliferation of smart phones and in their wake, an increasing number of digital lending 
apps. The challenge seen is that the sector has grown significantly without a proper regulatory 
framework, a fact that is associated with growing cases of predatory lending as competition for 
customer’s increase. This study sought to critically review the challenge of digital lending from 
a legal perspective with the intention of proposing a regulatory framework. The study relied on 
a variety of sources including primary sources such as acts of parliament from various 
jurisdictions, as well as case law. It also relied on secondary sources such as journals, online 
sources and legal literature discussion the issues. The main issues explored were the existing 
legal framework in Kenya under which digital lenders operate. Some consideration was also 
given to the reported practices of digital lenders especially relating to unfair trade practices. The 
study then focused on a benchmarking study of the regulatory framework governing digital 
lending in India and Nigeria, India being a more developed financial economy, while Nigeria 
offering an African perspective on digital lending. The key findings made included the 
following; First, there is no unified law or single regulator with a clear mandate to regulate the 
digital lending sector in Kenya, but there are several relevant regulators and laws that in total 
provide partial regulation of digital lending in the country. Secondly, it was determined that due 
to the gaps in regulation, digital lenders were infringing the rights of the mobile loan customers 
in Kenya, who are mostly the low income earners and with low levels of financial literacy. The 
third finding made in the comparison with India and Nigeria is that both countries had regulators 
with a clear mandate on digital lending, but in the Nigerian case, the presence of a strict 
regulatory climate seemed to stifle the growth of the sector. The main recommendations offered 
from the study were the enactment of an enabling law to establish a regulator for the sector or 
the amendment of existing laws to accommodate the issues arising from digital lending. The use 
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The process of using the mobile phone device to apply for and get a loans issued by a loan 
service provider to a borrowing customer. 
 
Digital Lending 
The act of offering a loan to a customer using online technology without the use of physical 
intermediation in order to deliver faster and effective outcomes. 
 
Digital Credit 
The collection of activities, systems and rules surrounding the issuance of loans using digital 
tools. 
 
Digital Platforms  
These are online entities that facilitate commercial interactions between at least two different 
groups, in this case between the lenders and the consumers.   
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1.1 Background to the problem 
In the last decade, many financial service providers in developing countries have adopted digital 
lending through mobile applications. Digital lenders in Kenya include Branch, Equitel Eazzy 
Loan, Jumo/ Kopa Cash, KCB-M-Pesa, Kopa Chapaa, Micromobile, Mjiajiri, M-pawa-Sacco, 
M-Shwari, Okoa Stima, Pesa na Pesa, Pesa Pata, Pesa Zetu, Saida, Tala, and Zindisha.1 It is to 
be noted that some of these digital lending products like KCB-M-Pesa and Mshwari are offered 
by banks. However, most of the other digital lenders are independent and the distinction between 
them is not very critical for this study since the same concerns exist for all digital lending 
entities, whether they are banking or non-banking institutions.  
The market for digital credit in Kenya is estimated at 6 million unique potential borrowers.2 The 
digital lending services are conveyed by a range of providers and target all individuals who have 
the ability to utilize them, which includes the unbanked, the disadvantaged in the society like 
the poor, the disabled and other excluded populations.3 It is to be noted that the traditional 
banking business was only accessible to the financially stable and those who had collateral and 
could access the bank branches and afford to repay the loans together with the interest and fees 
chargeable.4  
The key players in the mobile lending market based on the levels of loan disbursements, are as 
follows; Mshwari has disbursed over Kshs. 230 billion since its inception in 2012, Equity bank 
has disbursed a reported Kshs. 60 billion through digital lending since 2014, and Kenya 
commercial bank, the largest bank by assets base, provides 90% of its loans through KCB-
Mpesa.5  
Despite the above success of the digital lending disbursements, there are inadequacies that have 
also been reported. The inadequacies are driven by issues such as consumer exploitation, 
exorbitant interest rates, data privacy infringement on account of the vast quantities of personal 
                                                 
1 Kaffenberger M and Chege P, Digital credit in Kenya, time for celebration or concern? CGAP 2016 - < 
http://www.cgap.org/blog/digital-credit-kenya-time-celebration-or-concern> on 23 January 2017. 
2 Gubbins, P. & Totolo, E. Digital credit in Kenya: Evidence from demand-side surveys. Nairobi, Kenya: FSD 
Kenya. 2018, 69. 
3 Kendall J, Nataliya M and & Ponce, Measuring financial access Around the World.13.  
4 Totolo, E.The digital credit revolution in Kenya: an assessment of market demand, 5 years on. Nairobi, Kenya: 
FSD Kenya, 2018, 2. 
5 Paul Gubbins & Edoardo Totolo, 69. 
2 
 
information found in handheld devices, and lack of clear redress mechanisms for aggrieved 
consumers who are mostly low income earners with poor financial literacy. This explains why 
offering of loans through digital platforms is described by the World Bank both as a resounding 
success and at the same time, a regulatory minefield.6 The reported inadequacies arise due to 
the fact that that the digital lenders are not regulated by any financial regulator. Further, there is 
the absence of a substantive law to regulate the digital lending sector and effect of this includes 
the absence of clear offences that may be committed in situations unique to digital lending, and 
hence lack of a remedy in law for any aggrieved consumers. The lack of a regulator and the lack 
of substantive digital lending law will be discussed in detail in this paper. 
The main features of the digital loans are; loan eligibility assessment, loan appraisal, loan 
disbursement, and short loan tenures. Loan eligibility assessment is facilitated through the 
existing digital platform and therefore there is no need for a customer to have an existing account  
with a bank to receive the loan requested.7 Most lenders have designed their products in such a 
way that they only require the borrowers to have active mobile phone subscriptions.  
Secondly, loan appraisal and the resultant decisions on lending are automated and are based on 
data that is not the normal credit information used by banks.8 The approach adopted by these 
lenders is that all data is considered relevant for lending purposes and there is the reliance on 
alternative algorithms in determining whether or not to lend to borrowers . The data that is 
commonly used includes mobile phone utilization, mobile payments usage, airtime usage , data 
obtained from the borrower’s digital networking websites accounts. Typically, digital lenders 
do not require any collateral to offer loans. Rather they use the data provided by the user to 
assess their viability and their risk status. Thirdly, the loans are disbursed automatically as the 
resultant resolution to issue the loan is automated. This is the key distinguishing factor from the 
traditional bank loans which takes some time to be approved as the loan appraisal undergoes a 
human facilitated process. The loans are disbursed using mobile money services which currently 
include Mpesa, Airtel Money, and others. This creates and additional layer of terms of service 
(from service vendors) that digital lenders must deal with. Mobile money transfer service 
                                                 
6 Klein M and Mayer C. ‘Mobile banking and financial inclusion: The regulatory lessons’, Policy research 
working papers, 2011.  
7 Wang JC, ‘Technology, the nature of information, and FinTech marketplace lending’, Current policy 
perspectives (18)3, 2018, 3.  
8 Hurley M and Adebayo J, ‘Credit scoring in the era of big data’, Yale journal of law and technology, 2016, 148. 
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providers set their terms of service and establish their own fees, which are not regulated and 
usually vary from one provider to another.9 
The fourth characteristic is that due to the target market, the loans have a short tenure and are 
of high risk to the lender.10 The lender usually compensates for this risk through high pricing 
rate to ensure there is a high return, noting that the products have a high chance of default  as 
the target clients are the cash strapped and underprivileged borrowers.  
The interest rates charged in mobile loans is unregulated and varies, with the lenders having the 
discretion to set their own interest rates as the existing regulatory framework does not prescribe 
the interest rate to be charged on digital loans. For instance, borrowing Kshs. 100 from Mshwari 
and Fuliza would attract a monthly interest of 7.5% and an annual interest of 135%, but if one 
borrows Kshs. 2,500 from Fuliza, the annual interest is only 17%.11 The effect is that smaller 
borrowers are charged exorbitantly high interest rates, which in turn deepens their indebtedness 
and reduces their ability to get out of debt. Other offerings are as high as 620% per annum from 
Kopa Chapaa as reported by CGAP.12 This problem occurs as a result of the fact that the digital 
lenders are not regulated as discussed above and are free to charge any interest amounts. 
The pricing model for these mobile loans involves charging of interest rates either weekly or 
monthly, and there is the inclusion of facility fees and/or commissions. For the mobile loans 
platforms that are backed by commercial banks, there is the charging of a monthly facility fee; 
for instance, M-Shwari charges a 7.5% facility fee, which when computed adds to an annual 
rate of 90%. It is noted that even for these bank products which are regulated by the CBK, the 
banks charge a facility fee which then cannot be argued to be interest rate, noting that the CBK 
has power to limit the amount of interest rate payable but does not limit facility fees.13 Lending 
companies that are more established such as Branch and Tala normally charge 14% and 15% 
monthly interest rates, respectively, which if computed annually amounts to 168% and 180%, 
respectively, which is way higher than the set average of commercial banks’ of approximately 
13% per annum.14  
                                                 
9 Watima T, 'Self-regulation key in digital lending' Business Daily, 17 June 2019. 
10 Kaffenberger M and Chege P, Digital credit in Kenya, time for celebration or concern? 
11 Sunday, F and Kamau  M. Mobile loans: The new gold rush minting billions from the poor , 25th Jun 2019 , 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001331308/mobile-loans-the-new-gold-rush-minting-billions-
from-the-poor.  
12 Michelle Kaffenberger, Patrick Chege. 
13 Refer to Consumer Federation of Kenya (COFEK) v. CBA & others , 2018. 
14 Kaffenberger M, and Totolo E and Soursourian M, ‘A digital credit revolution; insights from borrowers in 
Kenya and Tanzania’ CGAP, working paper, 2018, 14. 
4 
 
The default rate associated with mobile lending is one of the key concerns that point towards 
the need for regulation. A report published by TransUnion, one of the three Credit Reference 
Bureaus in Kenya, indicated that there were 2.7 million persons having non-performing loans.15 
It was also noted from the report that out of this number, 400,000 of them were for loans valued 
at less than Kshs. 200. The 2019 Fin access survey puts the default rate of Mobile Lending at 
18%, which is higher than the default rate for commercial banks which stands at 2.2% and this 
is therefore excessive.  In contrast, Banks are governed by the in duplum rule which puts a 
ceiling on the interest a bank can charge on a loan by limiting the overall possible interest to the 
value of the loan. The clarity on the application of this rule was provided in  Desires Derive 
Limited v Britam Life Assurance Co. (K) Ltd, where Justice Tuiyot ruled that the In Duplum 
Rule is applicable to banks only and not to other lenders.16 In this case, the court stated that 
these provisions of the rule are applicable to the list of banks and financial institutions that are 
contained in the Schedule of the Central Bank Act, and any institution not listed in the schedule 
is not bound to comply with the act. In this case, Britam Life Assurance is not classified among 
the institutions that are included in the central bank schedule that are then subject to the in 
duplum rule.17 From the above decision, it is clear that digital lenders are not subject to this rule 
and there is no law barring them from charging excessive interest to customers. 
With respect to collection of overdue amounts, the debts are outsourced to debt recovery firms 
which are known to send incessant text messages to consumers, whether designed for their 
nuisance value or to intimidate customers into paying the loans.18 Some debt recovery firms 
have been known to call people in the lenders phonebook as part of the debt recovery process 
to compel them to pay. Some have even threatened to call the employers of a particular person 
in a bid to threaten them to pay back their loans.19 Some of the practices such as transfer of 
consumer data from the digital lender to a debt recovery firm, may need judicial determination 
in regards to their legality.  
On the uses of mobile loans, borrowers indicate that they use their digital loans for their business 
and farm activities, to meet day to day needs, to purchase airtime, for personal emergencies and 
for educational needs.20 These loans seem to be useful as a means of managing cash flow 
                                                 
15 Paul Gubbins & Edoardo Totolo, 44. 
16 (2016) eKLR. 
17 Section 2, Central Bank Act (Act No. 10 of 2018). 
18 Sunday, F and Kamau  M. Mobile loans: The new gold rush minting billions from the poor , 25th June 2019. 
19 Ogola, F. Why your favourite loan app might turn you into a pariah, 9 Dec 2018 
<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001305624/why-your-favourite-loan-app-might-turn-you-into-a-
pariah> 2019. 
20 Paul Gubbins & Edoardo Totolo 41. 
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challenges by businesses. The main concern with digital loans is that it is resulting in the 
vulnerable members of the society ending up in debt traps. The debt traps are the result of high 
interest rates, low capacity to services debts usually because of little or no income. This usually 
brings about a debt cycle where one borrows from one lender to pay off a loan on another.  
There are also concerns on infringement of consumer’s right of data protection arising, as the 
mobile applications that are relied on for digital lending collect and rely on the customer’s 
personal data, including extremely sensitive personal data to enable scrutinizing of their digital 
footprints for purposes of marketing and credit scoring. This mostly occurs without the 
knowledge and consent of the customer, thus breaching the consumer’s right to privacy and the 
right to information privacy guaranteed in the Constitution of Kenya.21 Such usage of data 
without the customer consent also contravenes global data privacy practices22 which issue will 
be discussed further in this paper. 
On the terms and conditions of the digital loans, consumers have expressed concerns that the 
terms are not clearly communicated at the time of the disbursement of the loan. According to 
the 2016 FinAccess survey, 19% of the respondents in the survey expressed concerns over 
unforeseen charges and unclear costs of loans. This is in contravention with the Consumer 
Protection Act, 2012 which requires that all credit providers disclose all the prescribed 
information relating to a credit agreement. The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) also issued 
consumer protection guidelines, which require that all lenders should fully disclose the total cost 
of credit to their customers. 23 It is noted that the digital lenders do not adhere to the consumer 
protection guidelines based on the 2016 FinAccess survey that borrowers are susceptible to 
exploitation by the digital lenders.24 There is therefore the need for the regulator to further assess 
how to protect consumers from the various forms of exploitation that they are likely to face from 
the digital lenders. 
This study therefore attempts to provide an assessment of the regulation governing digital 
lending in Kenya with the view of proposing stronger regulatory involvement of the 
government.   
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
                                                 
21 Article 31, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
22 Intersoft Consulting, The general data protection regulation, Intersoft Consulting, 2019, <https://gdpr-info.eu/> 
18 Sep 2019.  
23 Central Bank of Kenya, Prudential Guidelines, 22. 
24 FinAccess, 2016 FinAccess household survey, 2016, 13. 
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Digital lending services have improved the credit market landscape. However, the fintech sector 
faces many challenges and requires regulatory intervention. Exploitation of borrower by digital 
lenders is a concern, and the interest rate charged to the customers who take digital loans is 
exorbitant. Concerns also exist on the privacy of personal data collected from customers and 
how well the data is protected from misuse. From the above, there is need for a regulatory 
framework to guarantee better protection for consumers in order to provide a conducive and 
enabling environment for access to credit facilities to the public through these digital lending 
services. The problem this study intends to address is the need for regulations to address digital 
lending in Kenya. Therefore, this study will explore the issues surrounding the lack of the 
regulatory oversight on digital lending as the basis for proposing a fitting regulatory framework 
for the fintech sector.  
1.3 Justification for the Study  
The study is necessitated by the need to carefully examine the contribution that regulations 
aimed at the mobile lending sector would bring to the country in the context of the role mobile 
lending plays in providing access to credit for individuals. The study will identify the existing 
gaps in law and regulations and examine why they need to be addressed from a legal perspective. 
The findings will be important to regulators as they will help clarify the problems and the 
regulatory gaps that exist. The findings will also be important for the legislature in its efforts to 
create enabling laws for the fintech sector in general. The implications of the study will be that 
the case for regulation in the digital lending sector will have been established or disproved; 
hence it will be possible for interested parties to move forward based on in informed position.  
1.4 Statement of the Objective 
The aim of this study is to present the case for regulation in the fintech sector, specifically in 
the area of digital lending. The objectives of the study are; 
1. To examine the existing regulatory framework governing the digital lending sector in 
Kenya. 
2. To explore whether inadequacy of regulation is a contributory factor in exploitative 
lending practices in the digital lending sector. 
3. To benchmark digital lending regulations from India and Nigeria and issue proposals for 




1.5 Research questions 
The research questions undergirding this study are; 
1. What is the current regulatory framework available to digital lending? 
2. How does the lack of an adequate regulatory framework contribute to exploitative 
lending practices by digital lenders in Kenya? 
3. What lessons from other jurisdictions on regulations be used to improve digital lending 
practices in Kenya? 
1.6 Hypothesis 
This will proceed with the following hypothesis; 
1. Digital lending services in Kenya are exploitative to consumers because of lack of an 
adequate regulatory framework. 
 
1.7 Theoretical Framework 
1.7.1  Public Interest Theory 
Regulation is defined as the reliance on the statutes or mechanisms of law to implement social 
and economic policy.25 Regulation is also defined as the public administrative policing of a 
private activity, with respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest and serves as its main 
purpose to protect the vulnerable borrowers whose bargaining power is insignificant compared 
to the lenders.26  
The Public Interest Theory of regulation emerged from the works of A.C. Pigou in 1932 to cater 
for circumstances where authorities need to intervene in markets to ensure that the common 
good of the public is defended. Pigou argued that when private enterprises are left to operate 
unfettered even with competition, the result is always a skewed distribution of resources 
favorable or unfavorable to what he calls the national dividend. The remedies he proposes are 
taxes, price regulation or subsidies to balance out the benefits as related to public interest and 
the interest of the firms.27 Usually, businesses have asymmetrical power in the marketplace 
                                                 
25 Hertog J, General theories of regulation, Economic Institute/ CLAV, Utrecht University, 1999, 224. 
26 B. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms 
Columbia University Press, New York 1980, 7. 
27 Picou AC, The Economics of Welfare, Palgrave-MacMillan, New York NY, 1932, 381 
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when they are offering a unique product or when they occupy a monopolistic position. In this 
case, the business can take advantage of the public since the public has no alternative.  
Public interest theory addresses the challenges associated with market imperfections (such as 
positive and negative externalities) and market failure.28 Market imperfections characterized by 
excess costs paid by society as a result of the activities of an enterprise, or the excess benefits 
accrued to society at the expense of an enterprise. In each of these cases, the cost is transferred, 
meaning that the right party is not meeting its costs in the business transaction. With respect to 
market failure, the issue at play is lack of perfect competition. This situation is characterized by 
the presence of monopolies, oligopolies, monopsonies and oligopsonies. In these cases, there 
are either a single or a small number of large consumers or sellers. This situation affects free 
markets since influence is controlled by a few parties who can dictate market conditions such 
as pricing of goods and services. 
In the context of a study on regulation, it is clear that the presence of market imperfections and 
market failure are ideal conditions to put forward the case for regulation. In this case, digital 
lenders have near full control of the digital lending space since there are a small number of firms 
active in the sector, and they can collude to monopolize prices. There is also the issue of 
Information asymmetry, which is a position where one party in a transaction has better 
information than the other. In financial services like digital lending, information asymmetry 
occurs as the lenders have more information than the borrowers about the products being offered 
and their cost implications.29 As a result of the asymmetry, the consumers are uninformed about 
the risks that the contractual terms assign and are unable to choose terms that are favorable to 
them.30 Further, the lack of understanding of language used including the financial terms may 
give companies an incentive to exploit the ignorance by using sophisticated and unclear terms 
that would place the customer at a disadvantage.31 
Therefore, public interest theory provides a straightforward framework for assessing whether 
the conditions that should be met for regulation to be an option, have been met in the digital 
lending space.  
                                                 
28 World Bank, Public Interest Theory of Regulation, Body of Knowledge on Infrastructure Regulation, 
http://regulationbodyofknowledge.org/glossary/p/public-interest-theory-of-regulation/26 October 2019. 
29 Veljanovski C, ‘Economic approaches to regulation’ in Baldwin R and others, The Oxford handbook of 
regulation, Oxford Universty press 2010, 20 
30 Schwartz, A and Wilde, LL, ‘Imperfect Information In Markets For Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties 
and Security Interests’. Yale Law School, Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1119, 1983, 1389 
31 Schwartz, A and Wilde, LL, ‘Imperfect Information In Markets For Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties 
and Security Interests’, 1389 
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Public interest theories have been criticized by different scholars. 32One of the key criticisms of 
public interest theory is that it leaves open the determination of when public interest has been 
met, or it leaves that decision in the hands of regulators who may well be acting in their own 
interest.33 In case of a monopoly, there is also the risk of regulatory capture where public interest 
cedes ground to the interests of the regulator. Regulatory agencies such as the Central Bank of 
Kenya which exist for legitimate public purposes like protecting the public from exploitation, 
are then either mismanaged or become complacent resulting in failure to achieve these 
purposes.34 To prevent this, it is important for the financial services sector to ensure that 
principles of a sound regulatory framework, which include proportionality, certainty, flexibility, 
durability, transparency and accountability, are adhered to, regardless of the form of 
regulation.35 Noting that regulation may be costly,  it is critical that regulators ensure that the 
price of regulation is not too costly and that the regulations are not too stringent to prevent 
innovation and product development. 36 
There are four models of financial supervision currently employed across the world. These 
include institutional regulation, functional regulation, twin peaks regulation and integrated 
approach to regulation. 37  The selection of a specific regulatory model by a country is dependent 
on different factors, some of which may be unique to a specific country like it’s economic, 
political, legal and historic considerations.  
The institutional approach to regulation is where the legal status of an organization determines 
the regulator which is tasked to exercise oversight over its activities. In this model, there is the 
establishment of a regulator who strictly supervises all the activities that the institution engages 
in. 38 The key benefit of this model is that the regulator is more knowledgeable in the specific 
field and they continue to acquire a deeper expertise in the sector that they regulate. The major 
criticism for this approach is that it is not suitable for modern financial firms which perform a 
variety of functions.39 For instance, financial services offered by an entity like Safaricom may 
                                                 
32 Posner RA, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1974, 
5  
33 Price ME and Verhulst SG, Self-regulation and the Internet, Kluwer Law International B.V., 2005, 4 
34Posner RA, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 
35 New Zealand Treasury, The Best Practice Regulation Model: Principles and Assessments, 2012. 
36 Veljanovski , Economic approaches to regulation, 21 
37  Mwenda KK, Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator, World 
Bank, Washimgton DC,2006. 23 
38 Luis Garicano, ‘Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability;Seven Principles’, International Economic 
Law, 2010, 606. 
39 Taylor M, ‘Institutional structures of regulation’ in Caprio G Handbook of Safeguarding Global Financial 
Stability: Political, Social, Cultural and Economic Theories and Models, 2013, 473 
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fall in the financial services sector and also in the communications sector, leading to a regulatory 
overlap and there may be confusion and contradiction on compliance. 40This model has been 
adopted in China and Mexico.41 
The functional approach on the other hand centers on the specific tasks of institutions and 
assigns a different regulator for each of the different tasks being carried out, without regard to 
its legal status.42 The key benefit of this approach to supervision is that there is consistency, as 
a single regulator will apply consistent rules to the same activity regardless of the legal status 
of the entity in which it is conducted. This is the approach in use in Kenya where there are 
various sets of laws with different regulators.43 For instance, the activities of Safaricom are 
supervised by several regulators. Its telecommunications activities are supervised by the 
Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK) with the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) 
supervising digital financial services functional responsibilities.44 There are still other laws that 
are applicable over certain functions that Safaricom is obligated to comply with. For instance, 
issues of competition under the mandate of the Competition Authority of Kenya, Consumer 
Protection compliance as per the Consumer Protection Act and compliance with the provisions 
of the Data Protection Act.45 
The benefit of the functional approach to supervision is that there is consistency in supervision 
as a single expert regulator will apply the same rules to the same activities across board. The 
regulator is also able to engage people with expertise who can interpret the rules in relation to 
similar activities and apply them consistently across board, while also conducting adequate 
research on emerging technological issues.46 The key disadvantage of this approach is duplicity 
of regulation due to the existence of disparate regulators and potential inconsistency in the 
application of rules and regulations.47 This disadvantage can be addressed through co-ordination 
by various enforcement agencies with areas of cooperation including joint inspections, sharing 
of risk assessment tests and collaboration in research. 48 
                                                 
40 Malala J, Consumer Protection for Mobile Payments In Kenya: An Examination Of The Fragmented Legislation 
and The Complexities It Presents For Mobile Payments, 2013, 15 
41 Mwenda KK, Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator, 23 
42 Samuel J, The Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in the UK: The Final Reforms; 2016. 
43 Gibson E 'Regulating digital financial services agents in developing countries to promote financial inclusion' 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 2015, 28 
44 Malala J, Consumer Protection for Mobile Payments In Kenya, 215 
45 Malala J, Consumer Protection for Mobile Payments In Kenya, 230 
46  Taylor M, ‘Institutional structures of regulation’432 
47 Mwenda KK, Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator, 23. 
48 Mwenda KK, Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator, 24. 
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The twin peaks regulation model entails the separation of regulatory functions between two 
regulators, where one is responsible for prudential guidelines and another responsible for the 
conduct of business regulation. It is argued that this separation approach makes prudential 
regulation more intensive and it is an effective means of ensuring that issues of transparency, 
market integrity, and consumer protection receive sufficient priority.49 On the other hand critics 
argue that  the model is inefficient as it suffers from inadequate communication between the 
two regulators hence may be inefficient. 50 This model has been adopted in Australia, 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 51 
The fourth and final model of regulation is the integrated approach to regulation. This is where 
a single or unified regulator oversees both the prudential and conduct aspects for all the sectors 
of financial services.52 Some of the countries which apply this approach include Germany and 
Canada. The approach can be effective and efficient in smaller markets with the advantage of 
lower institutional and overhead costs of maintaining multiple regulatory agencies. 53 Critics 
argue that there is lack of competition to ensure that the regulator is challenged to outperform 
its competitors. 54 
When regulating financial services, two major approaches that are employed by countries in 
regulating the financial services industry are; the risk based approach to regulation and the 
principle based approach to regulation.55  
With the risk based approach to regulation, the object of regulation therefore is defined in terms 
of the risk posed and the regulation is justified in terms of its role in minimizing the risk. 56 In 
the present case of digital lending, there is exploitation of vulnerable consumers by profit 
seeking lenders. Government intervention through well detailed regulation is therefore is a 
necessity in order to minimize or prevent these consumer risks. The risk based approach is 
advantageous as it helps regulators to prioritize and  allocate scarce resources strategically and 
adjust the intervention according to properly assessed risks.57  
                                                 
49 Mwenda KK, Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator, 25. 
50 Taylor M, ‘Institutional structures of regulation’435 
51 Taylor M, ‘Institutional structures of regulation’432 
52 Mwenda KK, Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator, 30 
53 Taylor M, ‘Institutional structures of regulation’ 475 
54 Taylor M, ‘Institutional structures of regulation’ 475 
55 Mwenda KK, Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator, 23 
56 Mwenda KK, Legal Aspects of Financial Services Regulation and the Concept of a Unified Regulator, 27 
57 Izaguirre JC and Jenik I, 'Risk-based supervision in the digital financial inclusion era' 2016 GPFI White Paper-
Standard-Setters and Inclusion, 2016, -<https://www.cgap.org/blog/risk-based-supervision-digital-financial-
inclusion-era> on 23rd April 2020. 
12 
 
On the other hand, the principle based approach to regulation relies more broadly on principles 
to set the parameters within which regulated firms must carry out their business.58 They are 
written in a very general way so that they can be adaptable to different situations especially with 
technological innovation. The principles allow the regulated a discretion to choose the means 
that best achieves the outcome sought by the regulator.  For innovation, the principle based 
approach is ideal as it is flexible and is therefore able to deal with future issues of technological 
advancements as well as product development.59 
The principle based approach has several criticisms. First, there is no certainty on how the firms 
are to measure their compliance and what the exact expectation of the regulator is as there is no 
prescriptive rules and directions. Secondly, due to the lack of certainty, enforcement of legal 
rights for an aggrieved party may be problematic. The counter argument for this criticism 
however is that certainty of a rule is not dependent on whether a rule is general or detailed, but 
on whether there is an agreement on what the rule means and its intended outcome by all who 
are applying it.60 
1.8 Literature Review 
Regulation refers to rule making usually in the context of industry, and is usually a function of 
the government.61 In a synthesis of various definitions of regulation, Koop and Lodge found 
that there is scholarly consensus that regulation involves direct and intentional interventions 
with specific objectives.62 However, there are great disparities around how derivative definitions 
are developed to fit their conceptual context. Price and Verhulst conceptualized regulation as a 
continuum stretching from statutory activity (command and control) on one end, self-regulation 
in the center, and market regulation (laissez-faire approach) on the other end.63 This view uses 
the level of formality and legal effect as the scale for categorizing the nature of regulation. The 
authors point out further that in reality, regulatory environments have varying amounts of the 
three types of regulatory systems since they each have their advantages and disadvantages.  
It is noteworthy that on the aspect of self-regulation, that Digital lenders in Kenya came together 
to form the Digital Lenders Association of Kenya partly in response to the threat of statutory 
                                                 
58 Black J, ‘Making a success of principles based regulation’ Law and financial markets review, 2007, 191. 
59 Black J, ‘Making a success of principles based regulation’192. 
60 Black J, ‘Making a success of principles based regulation’ 191 
61 Kern A, Principles of banking regulation, Cambridge university press, New York, 2019, 4. 
62 Koop C and Lodge M, What is regulation? An interdisciplinary concept analysis, Regulation and Compliance, 
2017, 95-108 
63 Price ME and Verhulst SG, Self-regulation and the Internet, Kluwer Law International B.V., 2005, 4. 
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regulation that would have introduces external controls to their industry.64 Rahim, while 
appreciating that self-regulation is not an exact concept, discusses four basic forms of self-
regulation which are mandated self-regulation (government defines the norms and framework 
for development of regulations), sanctioned self-regulation (industry made, government 
approved), coerced self-regulation (made in response to threat of statutory regulation) and 
voluntary self-regulation (no state involvement). 65  
Lodge and Wegrich described the three cornerstones of regulation as standard setting, behavior 
modification and enforcement.66 Standard setting is the prescriptive component of regulation as 
outlined by the regulatory objectives and captured in legal statutes while behavior modification 
refers to the adoption of new requirements as set out by regulation, and where lack of 
compliance may lead to enforcement activity by the prescribed regulator. Koop and Lodge, 
while concurring with the three cornerstones proposed by Lodge and Wegrich, use the term 
sanctioning as opposed to enforcement.67 This presents a less invasive view to regulatory 
activity but still communicates the authority usually associated with regulators,  
Important concepts related to regulation include deregulation and non-regulation. Deregulation 
usually addresses the rolling back of state instituted measures intended to control the activities 
of an industry, while non-regulation refers to a situation where there does not exist regulatory 
dictates. Lodge and Wegrich add to the discussion of concepts in regulation by identifying the 
twin issues of regulatory failure, where existing regulation fail to achieve the intended 
objectives, and regulatory burden, which refers to the costs associated to compliance usually 
incurred by the regulated entities.   
One of the key issues driving need for regulation to protect consumers is information 
asymmetry, which essentially means that customers have much less information as compared 
to business enterprises such as digital lenders, and as such, regulation is required to ensure 
consumers are protected.68 Where digital lenders are not heavily regulated, they do have costs 
                                                 
64 Muchira, N. Should digital lenders worry as clients struggle? July 2 
2019<https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Should-digital-lenders-worry-as-clients-struggle/2560-5179802-
fs8a8qz/index.html> 2019. 
65 Rahim MM, Legal Regulation of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Meta-Regulation Approach of Law for 
Raising CSR in a Weak Economy, Springer Science & Business Media, 2013, 28.  
66 Lodge M and Wegrich K, Managing Regulation: Regulatory Analysis, Politics and Policy, The Public 
Management and Leadership Series, Macmillan International Higher Education, 2012, 14 
67 Koop C and Lodge M, What is regulation? An interdisciplinary concept analysis, 11(1) Regulation and 
Compliance, 2017, 95-108 
68 Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Report the steering committee on 
fintech related issues, 2019, 23.  
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associated with regulatory requirements and as such are able to offer higher interest to lenders 
and lower interests rates to borrowers.  Cartwright found that the common justification for the 
regulation of financial services is due to the need to protect the consumer, particularly the 
vulnerable consumer. 69 Blechman supports the view that to enable access to credit facilities for 
the poor and vulnerable, consumer protection policies are critical. The availability and 
accessibility of mobile credit products bring new risks to the most vulnerable and 
unsophisticated financial consumers and therefore sound regulation protecting the consumer is 
critical. 70 
It has been observed that digital lending platforms in Europe are not regulated in a similar 
manner as banks since they do not take deposits.71 The situation in the American digital lending 
space is that there has been little regulatory activity, but there is a growing case for regulation 
as digital lending becomes more prevalent in the country.72 A study conducted in Ukraine by 
Lavryk found that the increase in the volume of lending in Peer to Peer platforms coincided with 
a decline in bank lending.73 It may indicate a preference for digital loans compared to traditional 
loans issues by banks. These jurisdictions in Europe and America indicate that there stills lacks 
a unified approached to digital lending across these areas.  
In India, fintech evolved faster than regulators could keep up, driven by innovation in the sector 
on one hand, and on the other the reluctance of regulators to create rules which may have 
preempted innovation.74 Biscaye found that Indian digital loan products typically have longer 
repayment periods and lower interest rates compared to Africa mobile loan products. 75 
In the Nigerian case, it is reported that there has been a misconception that the Nigerian Fintech 
sector is not regulated because there are no laws or statutes that expressly state the word 
“fintech”. 76 However, the situation is such that there are several laws that address different parts 
of the fintech industry. Existing regulations address sectors such as digital payments (including 
                                                 
69 Cartwright P ‘The vulnerable consumers of financial services’ Law, policy and Regulation, 2011, 46 
70 Jason G, Blechman ‘Mobile credit in Kenya and Tanzania: Emerging regulatory challenges in consumer 
protection, credit reporting and use of customer transactional data, 2016, 43. 
71 Kern A, Principles of banking regulation, 5. 
72 Wilson JD, Creating strategic value through financial technology, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2017, 78. 
73 Lavryk A, P2P Lending as an alternative to banks’ lending in Ukraine, 11(4) Bank and Bank systems 2016, 20 
74 Patel M and Murthi R, ‘Regulation in the fintech era’ Fortune India, 
2019<https://www.fortuneindia.com/opinion/regulation-in-the-fintech-era/103450>, 19 Sep 2019. 
75 Biscaye, Review of digital credit products in India, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda, EPAR Technical 
Report #351a. 
76 Oturu D, Dan-Habu H, and Ojeshinagram K. Nigeria: Fintech Regulations In Nigeria - An Overview (Part 1), 
Last Updated: 8 April  2019,<http://www.mondaq.com/Nigeria >2019. 
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digital lending), data protection and cyber security.77 Fintech players formed the Fintech 
association of Nigeria, a self-regulating body that draws its membership from firms active in 
the fintech industry.78  Nigeria, just like Kenya, lacks a unified regulatory framework to govern 
the fintech sector, but instead relies on myriad laws and regulations that leaves regulatory gaps 
in the sector.79 This lack of coherent regulations is thought to stifle the development of this 
sector in a country that has the potential to become one of the largest fintech markets in the 
world.  
Didenko, in a study of fintech regulations in Kenya and South Africa concluded that the main 
barriers to effective fintech regulation are legal in nature and are not the result of technical 
challenges.80This conclusion underscores the evolving challenge of regulating the digital 
lending sector in Kenya. A study by Lebu looked at the challenges facing financial services 
regulation in Kenya and concluded that no regulatory model is ideal under all circumstances 
hence all new regulations should be made to meet the specific intended objectives for that 
industry.81  
1.9 Research Methodology 
The study is a doctrinal legal research. This study depends on the review and examination of 
primary and secondary sources of literature. The primary sources to be relied on include case 
law, statutes and regulations. The secondary sources to be used include encyclopedias, treatise 
and law journals, among others. The study shall achieve its objectives through an evaluation of 
the current laws and regulations affecting mobile lending in Kenya. There will be a review of 
academic journal articles, and reports concerning the issue of digital lending.  
There will be reliance on comparison with two jurisdictions, specifically India and Nigeria, 
which have existing mobile lending regulatory framework, with a view to highlight best 
practices. India was chosen due to the fact that it has a fintech industry with numerous players 
which is highly regulated and having gained independence earlier than Kenya, the country has 
more experience in the development of regulations. Nigeria was chosen because it will provide 
an African experience in Fintech regulation and it will also provide contextual value. 
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1.10 Chapter Breakdown 
Chapter 1 is the introduction and it presents the background of the problem, the hypothesis, the 
questions answered through this research and the research objectives. It also sets out the 
methodology and reviews the available literature relevant to the study. It also provides the 
theoretical framework through which to examine the research topic and relies on the public 
interest theory of regulation.   
Chapter 2 analyzes the digital lending sector in Kenya. This chapter will review digital lending 
regulatory framework and digital lenders practices in the Kenyan context. This chapter also 
analyzes the current position and efforts made to date in addressing the issues arising, either 
through the statutes or regulation and will identify the existing gaps. 
Chapter 3 will focus on comparing the Kenyan situation with other jurisdictions being India and 
Nigeria, and will highlight the regulatory framework in two different jurisdictions with regard 
to mobile lending. This comparison with the two jurisdictions will apprise the Kenyan policy 
makers on the best approach to be implemented. 
Chapter 4 will be the conclusion and recommendation arising from the study. The discussions 
will be based on the findings in Chapter 2 and 3 and will then assess whether the solution with 
respect to the issues arising lies in the development of a regulatory framework. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2  
DIGITAL LENDING FRAMEWORK IN KENYA 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was established that there is a need to examine the existing legal and 
regulatory framework surrounding the digital lending sector to determine the gaps that exist 
currently. It was also determined that the best approach to do this is to first examine all the laws 
and regulations that have relevance to the digital lending sector in Kenya.  
Digital credit in Kenya is normally offered through four business models. First, there is the 
pioneer business model where the mobile network operators (MNO) partner with banks or other 
financial institutions.1 In such cases the MNOs are the channel of disbursing the loans while the 
financial institutions operate the borrowers’ accounts and offer the funds and they bear the 
default risk for the loans. Examples of this model includes the partnership between Safaricom 
M-Pesa and Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) to issue the MShwari product. In such cases, 
the products are normally approved by the CBK and the banks are allowed to impose a facility 
fee on the product which is not considered to be an interest rate to be regulated by the CBK.2 
The second business model is reliance on applications to issue digital credit. This is where the 
companies offer loans from their existing funds without entering into any agreements with a 
financial institution. The borrowers are required to install an app on their mobile phones which 
collects data on the borrower’s mobile money usage as well as social media usage. It is through 
reliance on this data that the lenders assess and make decisions on whether the borrowers are 
creditworthy.3 Such lenders in Kenya include Brach, Saida and Tala loan facilities.  
The third business model is that of a bank offering digital services, where the banks develop 
their own digital infrastructure and therefore there do not partner with mobile network operators. 
An example is Equity Bank, through the Equittel product, where their telecommunication 
infrastructure is from Airtel Kenya.4 
                                                 
1 Francis E and others, Digital credit in emerging markets: a snapshot of the current landscape and open research 
questions, Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, 2017, 5. 
2 Central Bank of Kenya, Banking Supervision Annual Report, 2018. 
3 Hurley M and Adebayo J, ‘Credit scoring in the era of big data’, Yale journal of law and technology, 2016, 148. 
4 Mugo M and Kilonzo E, Community- level impact of financial inclusion in Kenya with particular focus on poverty 
eradication and employment creation, Central Bank of Kenya, 2017, 13. 
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The fourth business model in Kenya is Peer to peer lending (P2P). This model is a form of direct 
lending of money to customers without the participation of financial institutions. It is not as 
prominent as in other countries like India. P2P lenders provide the digital platform that links the 
customers to the lenders and they do not normally lend their own money as their role is limited 
to facilitating the lending process. In Kenya such companies include UbaPesa and Pezesha 
Loans.  
This chapter reviews the various laws and related regulators whose mandates cover elements of 
digital lending in an effort to find out where the regulatory gaps exist. The complexity of 
regulating digital lending institutions is that their business model spans so many traditional 
economic sectors. They are part technological companies and part financial service providers. 
Regulations in the digital lending sector should not only be driven by the need to protect 
consumers, but also the need to encourage the sector to achieve a greater good for society by 
playing a constructive role in creation of access to credit beyond profiteering, and also to show 
support for innovation in general. 
This chapter will begin by conducting a review of the existing legal framework governing digital 
lending, which in this case, refers to the key laws and regulations with some relevance to digital 
lending. The chapter then discusses the efforts made the digital lenders in self- regulation. The 
chapter concludes by summarizing the regulatory gaps identified in the preceding sections.  
2.2 Digital Lending Regulatory Framework in Kenya  
The digital lending sector in Kenya occupies a unique position in as far as its regulatory 
framework is concerned. The sector is currently not governed by any specific Act of Parliament. 
It operates within a plethora of laws that touch on different aspects of their operations. Existing 
legislation and regulations offer some form of legal reference to the firms by providing a 
reasonable basis for their operations. However, it is easy to see that their operations, being by 
their nature innovative, have elements that were not contemplated by existing laws. The need 
of regulation is underscored by Bratasanu who sees regulation as a necessary step in the digital 
innovation process to maximise the benefits of the digital revolution.5 In this section, the laws 
that have some relevance to the operations of businesses in the digital lending sector are 
identified and discussed with the view of identifying any existing legal and regulatory gaps. In 
this context, the laws that were seen to be of relevance to the operations of the digital lending 
                                                 
5 Bratasanu V, Digital innovation the new paradigm for financial services industry, Journal of Theoretical and 
Applied Economics, p 87. 
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sector were the Constitution of Kenya, The Companies Act, The Law of Contract Act, The 
Central Bank of Kenya Act, The Banking Act, The Microfinance Act, The Consumer Protection 
Act, The Competition Act, Capital Markets Act, Kenya Information and Communication Act, 
National Payment System Act, and the Data Protection Act. These Acts may be classified into 
Commerce legislation, Finance sector legislation and Information technology legislation. A 
mention is made of the Financial Markets Conduct Bill of 2018 that is still under discussion in 
parliament. It should be noted that it is not just digital lending institutions that operate under the 
purview of these Acts, but any business operating in Kenya would need to make reference to 
them, if their operations include activities that are regulated under these Acts. These Acts will 
now be reviewed in the specific context of digital lending institutions firms.  
In 2010, the Constitution of Kenya was promulgated and it recognized the rights of consumers.   
Specifically, Article 42 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 states; 
(1) Consumers have the right- 
(a) to goods and services of reasonable quality; 
(b) to the information necessary for them to gain full benefit from goods and services; 
(c) to the protection of their health, safety, and economic interests; and 
(d) to compensation for loss or injury arising from defects in goods or services.6 
The constitution provides the basis for all other acts that deal with matter related to consumer 
protection and fair business practices.  
Further the Constitution of Kenya also provides for the right to privacy and guarantees the right 
to information privacy under This article states that;  
"Every person has the right to privacy which includes not to have; information relating to their 
family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or the privacy of their 
communications infringed." It is on this basis that the need to safeguard the privacy of 
consumer’s data in the digital lending market. 
 
1.2.1. Commerce based legislation  
The first act with relevance to the operations of digital lenders is the Companies Act. The act 
provides the legal framework for the registration of companies providing different forms of 
company structures as well as the set of requirements a company must conform to legally 
                                                 
6 Article 47, Constitution of Kenya (2010).  
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operate in Kenya.7 The significance of the Companies Act in this review is that each digital 
lender registers its entity with the registrar of Companies and makes declarations in regard to 
the nature of business they intend to conduct. The company in presentation of its articles of 
association makes decisions on the nature of business they intend to conduct. For instance, the 
decision not to engage in the business of taking customer deposits is made at this stage, since 
taking of customer deposits would bring them under the control of the Central Bank of Kenya 
which is a regulator for deposit taking institutions.8 The registrar of Companies will not accept 
the incorporation of a deposit taking institution without an authority letter from Central Bank of 
Kenya confirming that they may proceed to incorporate the entity. This issue and the relevant 
legal provisions will be discussed subsequently in this chapter. 
Secondly, the Law of Contract Act is applicable to digital lenders as it provides for the elements 
that constitute a binding contract between two parties.  The existence of a valid and enforceable 
contract is a fundamental characteristic of the act of lending and borrowing. While the law is 
fairly straight forward, it has very interesting implications for the digital lenders and the fintech 
sector in general. The law states that for a contract to be binding, the parties must append their 
signatures in the presence of a witness. The main issue this raises is that the nature of digital 
lending does not allow for a third party in the transaction between the digital lender and the 
borrower. This is because the service is fully online and hence the traditional form of the Law 
of Contract Act is not a feasible option for handling the agreement between the parties. The 
other implication is that it brings into doubt the ability of digital lenders to recover their money 
in the traditional ways, which would involve recovering money from guarantors as spelt out in 
section 3(2) of the Law of Contract Act.9 Since there are no guarantors involved and mobile 
loans require no collateral, digital lenders have developed their own means of ensuring lenders 
pay back. It is to be noted that without executed guarantees, a lender cannot attach the property 
of a guarantor. The principles of this law remain sound, but a proper application of these 
principles in digital lending may require the input of and alignment with the Information and 
Communication Act. It is noted that sections 83G and 83P of the Information and 
Communications Act gives electronic records the same status in law as material provided in 
writing and recognizes electronic signatures.10 This is discussed in more detail in subsequently.  
                                                 
7 Section 5, The Companies Act (Act No. 17 of 2015). 
8 Section 4, Central Bank Act (Act No. 10 of 2018). 
9 Section 3, The Law of Contract (Act No 2 of 2002). 
10 Section 83, Kenya Information and Communication Act (Act No. 25 of 2015). 
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The Competition Act 2012 also has relevance to digital lending as it provides protection from 
unfair business practices which are defined as false, misleading or deceptive representation that 
may affect consumers or put them at an economic disadvantage.11 Section 56 of the competition 
Act lists a set of unconscionable conduct that businesses should not engage in, and they include; 
unreasonable conditions imposed on the consumer, customers’ ability to understand the 
conditions imposed on them, undue influence or pressure, and whether the pricing of the product 
was fair based on market rates. These circumstances were discussed in section 1.2, and it is clear 
that some digital lenders contravene sections of this Act especially when awarding loans, and 
when pursing defaulters.  
Section 56(3) of the Competition Act in particular gives provisions specific to banking, 
microfinance, insurance and other services. It provides that the institutions; 
Shall not levy unilateral fees and charges, by whatever name called or described, where 
the charges and the fees in question had not been communicated to the consumer prior 
to the provision of the service or their imposition.  
Consumers of digital loans have expressed concerns that the terms are not clearly communicated 
at the time of the disbursement of the loan. According to the 2016 FinAccess survey, 19% of 
the respondents in the survey expressed concerns over unforeseen charges and unclear costs of 
loans.12 Based on the above, this is therefore in contravention of the provisions of the 
Competition Act. 
The Competition Authority has developed consumer protection guidelines that have specific 
consumer protection in part VI of the act. In addition, the Authority is mandated to handle 
consumer complaints through its consumer protection department and gives specific directions 
to a supplier in the event of infringement of consumer rights. Section 22(b) 2 of the competition 
act prohibits trade associations, from colluding on elements such prices charged for services, 
interests, pricing formula, and other charges associated with their business. The act considers 
this a restrictive business practice.  
The act does not have specific provisions applicable to digital lending and from interpretation, 
it is applicable to digital lending business noting that Section 5 of the act states that its provisions 
are applicable to all persons and corporations that engage in trade.  
                                                 
11 Oraro C and Barasa J, Consumer protection law in kenya, < https://www.oraro.co.ke> 
12 2016 FinAccess Household Survey accessible on www.centralbank.go.ke. 
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So far, the acts reviewed above were all developed to cater for traditional sections of the finance 
sector. They did not take sufficient account of the fast paced changes in financial technology in 
the country. That is why the next four acts are particularly important in this discussion because 
they were all developed with a strong technological theme and intended to take advantage of 
technology to introduce efficiencies in the areas they regulated. These acts were developed 
largely in response to the requirement for a regulatory framework to govern digital commerce. 
In addition, Kenya enacted the Consumer Protection Act 2012, which provides protection for 
consumers from varied infractions that may come to them from the activities of business entities. 
The act provides legal remedies to consumers which include the option to sue businesses if they 
commit an array of offences such as overcharging a consumer, providing misleading 
information regarding a product, and among others.  
In line with the Consumer Protection Act, in 2014 the Communications Commission of Kenya 
produced a customer infomercial that elaborated on consumers rights as they access information 
technology products and services based on the Consumer Protection Act 2012.13 For instance, 
in relation to communications products, the Communications authority states that customers 
have, “The right to full pre-contractual information, which is clear, helpful, adequate, and which 
allows the consumer to make an informed choice”, What this indicates is that the 
Communications Authority looks at information technology products and services with the 
same eyes that would be used when looking at goods and services. The act does not have any 
express provisions applicable to digital lending but based on interpretation of its provisions, it 
is argued that, digital lending, being a technology-based service, is regulated under the 
Consumer Protection Act. 
1.2.2. Finance Sector Legislation 
The Central Bank of Kenya Act 14 is of relevance to the digital lending sector. The Central Bank 
of Kenya is the primary regulator in the financial sector and is charged with the development of 
financial policies that encourage growth in the Kenyan economy. Section 4 (1) of the Central 
Banks Act specifically states, “The principal object of the Bank shall be to formulate and 
implement monetary policy directed to achieving and maintaining stability in the general level 
of prices”.15 This indicates that at its core, all financial regulatory activities in the country are 
                                                 
13 Communications Authority of Kenya, Consumer rights and responsibilities, 2010, 2. 
14 Section 4, Central Bank Act (Act No. 10 of 2018). 
15 Section 4, Central Bank Act (Act No. 10 of 2018). 
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set on the policies formulated by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). Section 34(2) of the Central 
Bank Act provides that CBK may provide any services to any institution that it considers 
desirable, and the article further specifically lists the institutions to include Banks, Microfinance 
institutions and financial institutions any other person or body of persons which the Minister, 
on the recommendation of the Bank may by notice in the Gazette prescribe as indicated in 
section 2(b) of the Banking Act. From the above list of financial institutions to be regulated, it 
has been argued in the past that CBK has no power to regulate digital lenders as they do not fall 
under the list of the institutions. The discussion on why they do not fall in the lists of the above 
institutions is discussed in more detail subsequently. 
It is important to note that the same Section 34(2) of the act also provides for the minister to 
recommend to the CBK any institution where such regulatory services may be needed. In this 
way, there is a leeway for the minister to recommend to the Central Bank of Kenya to introduce 
services that would target the Fintech sector.  
The Banking Act can be argued to be of some relevance to digital lending institutions. This is 
the anchor law for all banking operations in the country and provides the legal basis for lenders 
to operate. In the definition of what constitutes a bank, one of the characteristics identified by 
the Banking Act is “lending”.16 It is argued that digital lenders are not banks per-se, based on 
the definition of what a bank is. This is because a bank is defined as a company which carries 
on, or proposes to carry on, banking business in Kenya but does not include the Central Bank. 
Banking business is then defined as the acceptance of deposits. As digital lenders are not deposit 
takers, they therefore do not qualify to defined as Banks, and therefore the CBK cannot regulate 
them. 
An argument may be raised that digital lenders are partially involved in banking due to their 
lending business.  However, this argument would affect the operations of financial institutions 
that are in the lending business, such as SACCOs, deposit taking and non-deposit taking Micro 
Finance Institutions (MFIs) among others which are currently not regulated by CBK.  Each of 
these institutions are regulated by specific regulators which include the SACCO Societies 
Regulatory Authority, and the Microfinance Unit within the ministry of finance.17 
                                                 
16 Section 2,1,(a) to (d), The Banking Act (No 10 of 2010). 
17 Ali AEE, ‘The Regulatory and Supervision Framework of Microfinance in Kenya, International Journal of 
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The Central Bank of Kenya directly regulates deposit taking microfinance institutions, but has 
places limits on the scope of activities they can engage in. Ali states, “They (deposit taking 
microfinance institutions) are not allowed to invest in enterprise capital; undertake wholesale or 
retail trade; underwrite place of securities; and purchase”. On the other hand, non-deposit taking 
microfinance institutions are required to lend their own money18. This makes them similar to 
digital lenders who are currently lending their own money for interest. However, one of the key 
differences between digital lenders and registered microfinance institutions is that the MFIs are 
required by section 11(a) of Microfinance Act to maintain a minimum capital base before 
licensing. On the other hand, digital lenders have no such requirement. As such, it is clear that 
being in the financial services sector doesn’t qualify an organization to be classified as a bank 
automatically and hence may not necessarily fall under the regulation of the Central Bank of 
Kenya.  
The Microfinance Act is of interest too in the discussion of the regulation of the digital lenders. 
In fact, this act defines a microfinance business, among other things, as one involved in, 
“providing loans or other facilities to micro or small enterprises and low income households”. 
19 Again, there is some area of overlap between the business of digital lenders and the law in 
regards to what constitutes a microfinance institution vis-à-vis a digital lender. Some digital 
lenders such as M-shwari allow for their users to save and to withdraw money at will, which 
then leaves the question of whether it should be considered as a microfinance institution. In 
some ways, digital lenders are completely involved in what would be considered microfinance, 
but with the single exception that they do not use the same methods as conventional 
microfinance institutions. They advertise, they accept loan applications, they make 
determinations in regards to the eligibility of the lender, they issue loans and they handle 
defaulting customers. Their practices therefore are all the same, save for their processes. 
Microfinance companies use traditional marketing methods and business process while digital 
lenders have deployed technology to reduce or eliminate human involvement in the loaning 
process.  
The Capital Markets Act, recognizes technology driven finance and is of relevance to digital 
lenders as and when they grow to be listed companies.  While there are no listed digital lenders 
as yet, it is projected that their inevitable growth will lead to a demand for more capital which 
will inevitably lead to them to the Capital Markets. At present, the Capital Markets Act 
                                                 
18 Ali AEE, ‘The Regulatory and Supervision Framework of Microfinance in Kenya, 124. 
19 Section 2, Microfinance Act (Act No 4 of 2012). 
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recognizes the role of technology and in section 11(1)(f) lists the development of an electronic 
commerce platform for the purposes and uses of the capital markets as one of the principal 
objectives of the Authority.20 Further, in section 11(3)(s) , the Capital Markets Act states that 
the Authority may “regulate the use of electronic commerce for dealing in securities or offer 
services ordinarily carried out by a licensed person”.21 In effect, the act recognizes that in the 
current business climate, person to person interactions, and even human mediation is no longer 
necessary for the conduct of business. This stance is more in line with the business model used 
by digital lenders when compared, say, to the stance taken by the Law of Contract Act, that 
requires a physical signature, complete with a witness, for a contract to be considered binding. 
Therefore, the Capital Markets Act is relevant to the discussion of digital lending regulations in 
two ways. First, the act is in the direct path of the natural progression of digital lending firms, 
and hence its provisions will have an effect on the future operations of the firms. Secondly, the 
act provides a more progressive view of e-commerce and technology and the role they play in 
business. This stance would be useful in any discussion regarding the best approach towards the 
regulation of digital lenders.  
1.2.3. Information Technology Legislation  
The Kenya Information and Communications Act (KICA) is a critical legislation that must form 
the regulatory framework for digital lending in Kenya, at least in part. 22 The law effectively 
equates hard copies of critical information, including contracts, with electronic copies and gives 
them the same legal standing.23 The implication of this is that an electronic agreement between 
a digital lender and borrower is enforceable as would a paper based form filled and deposited 
by a bank. The broad based act came into force to provide an enabling environment for the 
development of a digital economy and to take into account technological changes that promised 
more efficient delivery of services through media broadcasting, multimedia and 
telecommunications as well as electronic commerce.  
In 2010, the Kenya Information and Communications (Consumer protection) Regulations were 
passed by the Minister of Information and Technology in consultation with the Communications 
Commission of Kenya, pursuant to the powers to formulate regulations under the KICA. 24 
Specifically, regulation 3 gives the consumer of the services the right to receive clear and 
                                                 
20 Section 11, Capital Market Act (Act No.15 of 2018). 
21 Section 11, Capital Market Act (Act No.15 of 2018). 
22 Kenya Information and Communication Act (Act No. 25 of 2015). 
23 Section 83, Kenya Information and Communication Act (Act No. 25 of 2015) 
24 Communications Authority of Kenya, Consumer rights and responsibilities, 2010, 2. 
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complete information about rates, terms and conditions for available and proposed products and 
services. The consumer also has the right to be protected from unfair trade practices, including 
false and misleading advertising and anti-competitive behavior of the licensee. In 2016, the 
Competition Authority of Kenya issued an order that required all lenders to declare their fees to 
a client before they advance a loan, as a response to findings that lenders, including digital 
lenders, had hidden fees in their financial products.25 Licensees are required under the 
Communications Authority regulation 5 to make inquiries and lodge complaints regarding the 
services. What this indicates is that the Communications Authority looks at information 
technology products and services using the same criteria that would be used on goods and 
services.  
The National Payment Systems Act was developed to address the gaps that were seen to emerge 
in the era of mobile payments and online payments and sought to ensure that the sector was well 
governed and to prevent money laundering. The act defines a payment system provider as “a 
person, company or organization acting as a provider in relation to sending, receiving, storing 
or processing of payments or the provision of other services in relation to payment services 
through any electronic system”. 26 The act seems to come close to the regulation of digital 
lenders since it was developed mainly to regulate the conduct of mobile money transfer services, 
hence mobile money transactions. Its key shortcoming is that it preceded digital lending, and 
therefore did not anticipate that activities of digital lenders since at the time it was not an issue. 
The existence of the law is nonetheless an important signal that the legislature was taking into 
account the changing landscape in the financial services sector, and as such was working to 
ensure that the sector was well regulated in line with the then most recent changes in the sector.  
Most recently the Data Protection Act came into effect in 2019. The Data Protection Act seeks 
to give effect to article 31 of the Constitution of Kenya which states, “Every person has the right 
to privacy, which includes the right not to have … (c) information relating to their family or 
private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or (d) the privacy of their communications 
infringed.”27 In so doing, the act provides express provisions regarding the handling of data 
collected from members of the public and puts in place checks and balances that will ensure 
personal data collected in Kenya, or relating to Kenyans even if collected overseas is protected.28 
                                                 
25 AFI CEMC, 'Digitally delivered credit: Consumer protection issues and policy responses to new models of digital 
lending', 2017, 8. 
26 Section 2, National Payment Systems Act (Act No 39 of 2011). 
27 Article 31, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
28 Section 3, Data Protection Act (Act No 24 of 2019). 
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This act has crucial implications to the operations of the digital lenders and all app-based 
businesses since they largely deal with data provided by consumers. Some of the digital lending 
apps also ask users for permission to access their financial data such as mobile money balances, 
records held by the CRBs, and personal contacts. While it addresses some of the key loopholes 
that digital lenders may have used for some of their more extreme business practices especially 
in violation of consumer’s data, the question of a unified regulatory regime for digital lenders 
remain, and requires a more definitive answer. 
The review of the above various acts that bear some relevance to the regulation of digital lending 
in the country brings into realization the following issues. It is clear that there is no law or 
regulation that has been developed to deal directly with the legal issues arising from the 
operations of digital lenders. In other words, digital lenders “operate in a regulatory lacuna with 
no bespoke legislation”. 29 While this point is taken into account, it is important to note that 
there has been progressive development of laws and regulations to accommodate the market 
dynamics that are associated with the increasing role of technology in the Kenyan economy. 
Acts like the Capital Markets Act, the Information and Communications Act, and the National 
Payment Systems Act, and most recently the Data Protection Act, already have the principles 
that may be advanced towards the development of a fitting regulatory regime for digital lenders. 
This is welcome news in the sense that while there may lack bespoke regulations for digital 
lenders, the principles required are already laid out in other laws and may only require 
customization to address the unique environment of digital lending.  
The national assembly is currently has the Financial Markets Conduct Bill of 2018 pending 
before it, which bill proposes various initiatives to regulate, among other things the digital 
lending business in Kenya.30 The bill intends to establish the Financial Markets Conduct 
Authority which is an institution designed to regulate credit in the country. It has a strong 
emphasis on retail credit and its objectives span the key activities of lending organizations such 
as setting the cost of credit and information provided to consumers. The bill also creates the 
office of the Financial Sector Ombudsman, Financial Sector Tribunal (the Tribunal) and the 
Conduct Compensation Fund Board, which will be responsible for policing and oversight of the 
financial sector generally. The Financial Sector Tribunal’s main mandate is to hear applications 
for review of the decisions of the Financial Markets Conduct Authority while the mandate of 
                                                 
29 MMAN Advocates, Regulation of Mobile Lending Entities in Kenya, 13 August 
2019_<https://mman.co.ke/content/regulation-mobile-lending-entities-kenya>on 8 December 2019. 
30 Section 12, Financial Markets Conduct Bill (2018). 
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the Ombudsman is to resolve complaints and disputes between customers and lenders in relation 
to the provision of financial products and financial services. The Conduct Compensation Fund 
Board is mandated to remit compensation to customers once their claims are successful. The 
sources of the funds for the Board include amounts appropriated by Parliament, amounts paid 
by Lenders into the Levy Account and administrative penalties imposed in respect of 
contraventions of the law.31 These institutions proposed in the bill will to a great extent will take 
away the supervisory powers of the Central Bank in relation to provision of retail credit 
facilities. The CBK has been opposed to the bill, saying that the bill infringes on its mandate 
and may weaken its ability to execute its functions as the bill creates the office of another 
regulator. 32   
An important development to the digital lending space internationally is a recent update on the 
terms of service affecting digital lenders by Google, the dominant player in the App delivery 
business. Google announced that it will no longer allow Apps that offer loans which should be 
repaid in 60 days or less on Google play store.  Most lending Apps are hosted on Google play, 
and without it, digital loan institutions will not be able to access customers. Google’s move has 
been seen as a foray into the regulatory space and has been met with skepticism by digital 
lenders. The fact that Google has to make a decision like this further indicates that there is a 
significant legal regulatory gap at the international level for digital lending institutions. This 
decision by Google is therefore expected to force some changes to the operations of digital 
lenders both locally and internationally. 
2.3 Movement toward Self-Regulation by Digital Lenders Association of Kenya 
Players in the digital lending space have recently started examining ways of self-regulation to 
try and address the regulatory challenges and the consumer public outcry that they are currently 
experiencing. Self-regulation is not a unique concept in the Kenyan legal system. For instance, 
one of the best developed self-regulatory systems is the one used by accountants under ICPAK 
and the International Accounting Standards Board.33 The legal profession also carries out self-
regulation through the Law Society of Kenya, while the Banking sector achieves the same goals 
through the Kenya Bankers Association. It may however be argued that these bodies are 
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33 Watima T, 'Self-regulation key in digital lending' Business Daily, 17 June 2019 -
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successful largely because they have an anchor law to regulate their sector. In addition, there is 
a concern that fintech firms are very sophisticated players while borrowers generally lack the 
sophistication needed to understand the full import of their borrowing hence the need for 
regulatory protection.34  
Digital lenders have recently begun the journey towards self-regulation through the Digital 
Lenders Association of Kenya (DLAK). This move to self- regulate may have been motivated 
in part by the realization that the government was actively pushing for regulation of the digital 
lending sector. DLAK states in its websites that its aim is to “set ethical and professional 
standards in the industry, to collaborate with policy makers and other stakeholders in addressing 
industry issues, contribute to knowledge and learning and to drive the overall growth of the 
digital lending and fintech sector”.35  
DLAK has developed a code of conduct for its members and is available through its website. 
The very development of the DLAK code is a laudable step since it creates a semblance of 
regulation and provides an option for the regulation of digital lenders in the absence of a legally 
instituted regulator of the sector. DLAK, as a sector representative, is a good indication that the 
players in the sector are aware of the need to formalize the regulation of the sector. The efforts 
included in the code to offers some types of remedies for bad business practices by its registered 
members is also welcome since these are among the chief goals of regulation. The remedies 
include mediation. In these ways, DLAK Code is a welcome addition to the efforts towards the 
formalization of regulation of digital lenders.  
One of the key problems associated with the DLAK code of ethics is that it is not mandatory for 
all players in the digital lending business to follow and subscribe to it. In fact, in the statement 
of objectives of the code, DLAK states that its members “are entitled to voluntary application 
of this code”.36 This gives the members the power to choose whether to apply the code to their 
business or not. While the practicality of this approach can be appreciated seeing that DLAK is 
not a statutory body, it does not serve to generate the confidence that would be needed for the 
complete protection of consumers from predatory lending practices and other malpractices. 
Further, it is noted that the entire DLAK code of conduct does not refer to any specific law as 
the basis for any of its provisions, but only addresses the law in general terms. A deeper look at 
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35 DLAK, ‘Home’ 5 December 2019-<https://www.dlak.co.ke/> on 5 December 2019. 
36 Digital Lenders Association of Kenya (DLAK) Code of Conduct, 2.  
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the DLAK code of ethics demonstrates that there is a legal and regulatory gap under review. 
Section 2(II) of the DLAK code states;  
Digital Lending Institutions (DLIs) will conduct their activities in accordance with the 
law, complying with the regulations governing their functioning, established 
jurisprudence, as well as binding decisions, instructions and guidelines of supervisory 
institutions such as the Treasury, Communications Authority, Central Bank of Kenya, 
Competition Authority of Kenya and any other regulator in the Financial Services Sector 
in Kenya in the scope of duties performed by these institutions. 
As such, there is no native law under which this sector operates, and as such, it is forced to draw 
from the existing legal framework that generally governs the operations of businesses and 
financial institutions to find principles that are relevant to it. While the stated goal of conducting 
their activities in accordance with relevant laws is laudable, it is still not an ideal situation since 
there would be no remedy in law for activities of the members that violate the set code. 
In the DLAK code, the most severe form of punishment a digital lender may suffer is the 
cancellation of their membership from the association. It is important to note that said 
membership to DLAK is voluntary and as yet only 11 out of  an estimate of about 50 digital 
lenders are registered as members of DLAK37 and therefore cancellation of membership may be 
argued not be an effective deterrent factor as it lacks the firepower needed to constrain 
misconduct effectively and to incentivize compliance. 
Some other disciplinary measures listed in the code include various warnings, compulsory 
training, public denouncement of an entity, and suspension of membership.38 All these measures 
would only be significant if the association already had a strong influence in the market. As 
such, this leaves the consumers still exposed to predatory practices from the digital lenders 
which will persist until the association gathers the stature needed to be effective in its self-
regulatory function among its members. 
The association has attempted to address the various customer grievances by making specific 
provisions that lenders should comply with. For instance, one of the provisions included in the 
DLAK code of conduct section III (3.3) states; 
Digital Lending Institutions (DLIs) should ensure consumers have access to clear pricing 
and are empowered to make informed decisions on the loan product that best meets his 
or her needs. DLIs should separate key terms such as principle, interest, fees, tenure and 
other items into separate line items. DLIs should include visual representations (such as 
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38 Section VIII (II)8.2, Digital Lenders Association of Kenya (DLAK) Code of Conduct. 
31 
 
calendars) to indicate due date(s) for payment, when past-due periods begin and other 
key timelines.39 
The fact that the recently publicized code of conduct presents these requirements in such detail 
indicates that the general practice in the industry may not been up to these standards. It can only 
be hoped that moving forward, every digital lender who subscribes to this code of conduct will 
abide by these practices which seem intentioned on empowering the consumer. The key 
outstanding regulatory issues that arise under these terms are what needs to be communicated 
to a digital lender, and what shall be taken as adequate proof of such communication. As with 
the other issues associated with digital lending, there is no legal fallback position for any 
customer who may feel defrauded by accepting terms to a loan that they were not aware of, 
either because they were not informed, or the terms were not presented in a form that made it 
easy for them to access it.  
On the matter of debt collection practices, the DLAK code of Conduct section VII provides 
guidelines the members should use in the case of default. The guidelines are developed to 
encourage an “amicable resolution of the case”.40 The process in the code includes 
communication with the consumers to determine cause of delay and proposing ways of 
repayment. In addition, the code requires the member of the association to ensure that their 
preferred debt collection agency abides by the best practices of the industry in the course of their 
duties. In addition, the digital lending institution is required to supervise the work of the debt 
collection agency. A question may be raised in regards to what the supervision would entail, 
and whether such supervision is practical, effective and acceptable in law.  
 
With respect to the issue of customer data, the DLAK code of conduct section IV(4.2)c allows 
its members to share consumer data with “authorized persons”, but does not indicate who these 
persons may be, and who would authorize them.41 This still leaves room for them to share 
consumer data with entities that may be authorized by the digital lenders themselves. An attempt 
is made in section IV(4.2)d of the code of conduct to ensure that this will be done under the law, 
but the language seems to leave it open to a digital lender to decide in who an authorized person 
is.42 This indicates that there is a need for a regulatory provision with legal effect that will cover 
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who digital lenders can share their information with, especially in the context of the newly 
enacted Data Protection Act.  
 
The CBK Governor’s response to the formation of DLAK is as telling as it is cautionary. The 
Governor stated “Voluntary industry standards still allow the bad actors to stay out of an entity 
like DLAK and do business as usual,” and he further added that regulation could be 
“implemented by an independent consumer protection agency or at least an independent 
department in a regulator with an expanded mandate to cover non-banks.”43 
 
From the above, it is therefore arguable whether self- regulation is an effective regulatory tool 
for the digital lenders. Critics of self-regulation in the financial services industry argue that the 
private enterprises cannot be trusted to regulate their own activities in a manner conducive to 
promotion of publicly desirable goals, noting that their main focus is to make profits.  In 
addition, the critics point to its intrinsic inadequacies, including lack of effective enforcement 
capabilities, inability of self-regulatory organizations to gain or maintain legitimacy, and 
ultimately, the failure of accountability. 44 It has also been noted that fintechs generally position 
their businesses in ways that avoid regulatory oversight, usually by citing the restrictive nature 
of regulatory oversight when applied to innovation.45 It is therefore clear that a more effective 
legal regime is needed to ensure that players in the sector are legally liable and are held 
accountable for clearly defined offences committed in the digital lending space.  
2.4 Conclusion  
Based on the review above, the following are some of the gaps in the existing legislation that 
have been identified. First, there is the absence of a substantive law to anchor the digital lending 
sector. The effect of this includes the absence of clear offences that may be committed in 
situations unique to digital lending, and hence lack of a remedy in law for any aggrieved 
consumers. This is in contrast to most other players in the financial sector who operate under 
the guidance of a substantive law which has expressly listed offences and penalties. In addition 
to this, there is the absence of a fintech-specific regulator, with the sector finding itself at the 
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mercy of various regulators whenever an element of their businesses activity falls within the 
role of that regulator. 
 The other key issue arising is in the lack of a substantive definition of what constitutes a contract 
between a digital lender and the borrower in the context of the Law of Contract Act and the 
Kenya Information and Communication Act, and the associated enforceability of the rights of 
the lender during loan recovery based on the lending process that does not seem to require a 
signature, whether physical or electronic. The other gap seen in this review is that the provisions 
in the consumer protection laws need to be enhanced in the context of digital lending. There is 
need for clear regulatory provisions and set mechanisms to ensure proper redress on issues 
arising between lenders and borrowers in the digital lending space.  
There is also the insufficiency of the provisions of the Central Bank of Kenya Act as it deals 
only with deposit taking institutions and hence digital lenders do not fall under the robust 
regulatory regime that covers other financial institutions. This gap is further demonstrated by 
the differences between commercial banks and digital lenders as defined by the Banking Act, 
which excludes digital lenders from regulation by the CBK, as the lenders do not take deposits. 
On the aspect of the possible regulation by the Communications Authority (CA), there lacks 
sufficient overlap between the business of digital lenders and the mandate of the CA, hence they 
are not subject to regulation as communications companies.  
In summary, there are two broad regulatory gaps in the digital lending sector. Firstly, there is 
the absence of a dedicated digital lending regulator, while the second one is insufficiency in 




DIGITAL LENDING REGULATION IN INDIA AND NIGERIA 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the focus was on the mobile lending sector in Kenya. The key 
discussions in that section were centered on an analysis of the regulatory environment of the 
Kenyan mobile lending sector. Key laws that are of relevance in the regulation of the digital 
sector were analyzed. The role of the Digital Lenders Association of Kenya was also considered 
in the context of the self-regulation and its shortcomings assessed. The section also considered 
the ongoing practices of digital lenders and helped to demonstrate that there are insufficiencies 
in the existing regulation that lenders in the digital lending market may exploit to circumvent 
the law and to sustain unethical business practices.   
This chapter analyses the digital lending regulations in two jurisdictions as the basis for making 
comparisons with the Kenyan situation, with a view to draw lessons that can be to inform the 
case for digital regulation in Kenya. The chapter looks at digital lending regulations in India, to 
learn from its highly developed fintech sector which is reported to have over 1000 digital lenders 
with funding of more than USD 2.5 billion.1  The chapter also looks at the digital lending sector 
regulations in Nigeria primarily for its contextual value since Nigeria shares many 
socioeconomic similarities with Kenya. Being an African country, regulations in Nigeria are 
implemented in an environment that bears similarities with the Kenyan Context. This makes it 
an ideal comparison to Kenya’s environment.  The discussions on the regulations in both India 
and Nigeria are based on a review of their legal documents such as laws and regulations, as well 
as scholarly articles and significant opinions on the issues touching their respective regulatory 
environment.  
India is the world’s largest parliamentary democracy with a federal system. This is similar to 
Nigeria’s federal governments which both have parallels to Kenya’s devolved system of 
government composed of a national and county governments.2 India has a population estimated 
at 1.38 Billion, while Nigeria has a population 200 Million people compared to Kenya’s 
population of 53.6 Million. This means that India’s population is approximately twenty six times 
                                                 
1 KPMG, Fintech in India powering mobile payments, 2019,12. 




larger than Kenya’s while Nigeria’s population is about four times larger than Kenya’s 
population. The differences in population size means that Kenya can learn from India and 
Nigeria in regards to how fintech industries operate at scale. In 2018, the World Bank estimated 
India’s per capita GDP at $2,099 and Nigeria’s GDP at $2028, compared to Kenya’s per capita 
GDP of $1710 in the same period.3 Kenya, India and Nigeria are former British colonies and 
therefore share a common legal heritage based on common law. This means that there it the 
laws in these jurisdictions will share similarities and are easy to domesticate in the context of 
mobile lending regulations.  
3.2 Digital Lending Regulations in India 
The role of technology in India’s financial services sector has been increasing significantly, and 
is one of the well-known countries with a strong fintech sector. India’s approach to fintech 
regulation and by extension digital lending makes it a fitting country to make a comparison for 
assessing the need for regulation for digital lenders in Kenya.  
The first element that needs to be noted with the Indian fintech system is that there is a regulator 
whose mandate includes the regulation of Fintech firms alongside the entire Indian Banking 
system. The Indian banking system, part of which is the digital lending sector, is governed by 
the Reserve Bank of India 4using the Banking regulation Act of 1987.5 The Reserve Bank is 
given power to manage the financial affairs of the country in ways that are thematically similar 
to the role of the Central Bank of Kenya. It is noted that while the Central Bank of Kenya is 
constituted as an independent body free from political interference, the Reserve Bank of India 
operates under the instructions of the central government. The Reserve Bank of India Act states 
as follows; “The Central Government may from time to time give such directions to the Bank 
as it may, after consultation with the Governor of the Bank, consider necessary in the public 
interest”. 6  
This influence by the central government may have the benefit of ensuring the reserve bank 
works in greater harmony with other state departments in the implementation of the policies of 
the central government, but it can also expose the bank to unwanted political influence, or may 
water down its ability to make the best monetary policy decisions if the central government does 
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not approve.  As a result of the above, India may have a strongly regulated financial services 
sector based on the power given to the Reserve Bank of India over other banks, and then the 
power of the central government over the Reserve Bank of India. In this aspect India is different 
from Kenya because its fintech industry came up in an environment that was more regulated 
compared to the Kenyan financial services sector where regulations attempt to catch up with 
innovation. 7 
On the matter of fintech technologies, two main issues are under consideration. These are the 
technologies used to offer financial services, and the emergence of regulatory technologies. On 
the first issue, it is important to note that the overall technological platform used by digital 
lenders in Kenya and India are the same. In the Indian market, mobile banking is available 
through smartphone apps. 8 In addition, players in the fintech industry in the country rely on 
mobile apps to make mobile banking applications such as digital lending available to 
consumers.9 In these two respects, mobile banking in India would offer the same level of 
convenience that has been associated with mobile banking in Kenya, since the technologies are 
the same.  
The second element of the fintech industry of importance to this study is the emergence of 
regulatory technology (regtech) as part of the Indian business ecosystem. Regtech can be 
explained as the management of regulatory processes within the financial industry through 
technology. In India, regulatory technologies are coming into play riding on the capabilities of 
technology in today's financial markets to give regulators data that would traditionally take 
longer to gather.10 These regulatory technologies assist regulators to monitor fast-moving events 
such as real-time transactions within the financial services sector. In the context of digital 
lending, technology can be deployed to monitor the activities of digital lenders in real time. 
With the addition of data query capabilities, a regulator may be able to tell when a company is 
involved in fraudulent or unethical lending activities simply based on the data collected by 
regulatory technologies in the same way that digital lenders use technology to generate risk 
profiles of their borrowers.  This is an efficient way of monitoring and ensuring compliance 
with existing laws by the digital lenders. 
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The third element in this review is the state of mobile lending in India, in terms of market 
dynamics. As at 2014 mobile retail loans constituted 7% of the Indian economy. 11 No recent 
reports could be located on the current volume of mobile retail loans in the country. It is however 
very reasonable to assume a large increase in this volume because of the continued growth of 
technology in the Indian financial services sector.  
The second finding in regards to market dynamics was that fintech firms offer collateral-free 
loans in India and as such, make it possible for retail customers to access loans that they may 
not have been able to access from commercial Banks.12 This means that on this point, India is 
not different from Kenya in as far as the motivations behind the growth of mobile loan services. 
Similarly, businesses that seek mobile loans are those that are not able to access formal 
commercial loans due to lack of collateral.  
The third finding made in regards to market dynamics was that India’s mobile lending 
ecosystem includes a robust peer-to-peer digital lending system, which is a model that is not 
prevalent in Kenya. Other lending platforms in India include cluster-centered funding, point-of-
sale (POS)-based lending, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending and invoice-based lending.  Peer-to-peer 
lending is when lenders jointly collaborate to give their money to borrowers mediated by a 
computerized digital lending system. What this means is the digital lending company does not 
have to lend from its balance sheet but rather, individuals with finances to invest provide that 
money to lenders based on the criteria set by the system.13  This varies from the Kenyan case 
where the preferred model is lenders have their own designated funds and give these to 
borrowers. In light of this issue, Kenya may need a set of regulations that will govern peer-to-
peer lending in the event that becomes mainstream.  Some of the regulations, like in the Indian 
case, can include limiting the influence of any one lender in the system and limits on risk 
exposure to any one borrower by the system. 14 Such regulations will make it harder for an 
individual to influence lending practices, and at the same time will limit any damage that may 
be caused by any single large borrower. 
A review of the specific regulations in the Indian fintech sector was carried out, and the main 
findings were as follows. The Peer to Peer (P2P) lending platforms in India are the most 
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common and are governed by a specific regulation issued by the Reserve banks of India. These 
regulation is titled “Master Directions - Non -Banking Financial Company – Peer to Peer 
Lending Platform (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2017”. The regulation has several specific 
regulations that are of interests to this study. First, Regulation 5 outlaws the operation of any 
peer to peer lending network without registration with the bank, and at the time of the 
implementation of the regulation, P2P firms in India already in operation were required to 
register with the Reserve Bank.15  
Regulation 6 provides a detailed scope of activities of the P2P lenders, which include prohibition 
from holding deposits and or lending on their own.16 The regulation clearly defines them as 
intermediaries, meaning that they cannot load their own funds except those raised in the P2P 
platform and requires them to facilitate the necessary due diligence in the interest of lenders on 
their platform. On disputes and customer protection, regulation 13 requires P2P Lending 
platforms to put in place a dispute resolution policy, and the mechanism for dispute resolution 
is restricted to one month following the filing of a complaint.17 An aggrieved party can appeal 
or make a complaint with the regulator if a dispute filed with the company is not addressed 
within the period.  The above regulations indicate that the Indian government adopted a 
regulatory framework that addressed some of the critical concerns that would arise from online 
lending, and it spans registration of the business, all the way to grievance resolution.  
The fourth finding made in regards to market dynamics was that mobile lending apps in India 
use the same criteria as the mobile lending apps in Kenya to award loans. The criteria include 
review of call records, volume of transactions, and use of mobile money to pay utility bills, 
among others to determine whether to lend to a potential borrower.18 This then means that India 
is dealing with the same data protection challenges that Kenya sought to address through the 
Data Protection Act. In the Indian case, section 43A if the Information Technology Act, 2000, 
makes any information technology company that handles personal data liable for any misuse of 
that data if it occurs due to negligence.19 Section 72A of the same act makes data handling 
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subject to the contractual terms between the two parties and as such, there is a loophole that one 
party may suffer at the hands of the other. This was however a better effort at consumer 
protection than what Kenya had before the Data Protection Act was enacted.  
With respect to data protection and the right to privacy in India, the protection is accorded under 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India that provides for the fundamental freedom to life and 
liberty. The Courts in K. S Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [Writ 
Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012] (India) ruled that the right to privacy is an intrinsic part of 
the right to life and personal liberty. The Indian courts have given paramount importance to the 
right of privacy which can only, in their opinion, be interfered with only due to compelling 
reasons, such as national security and in the interests of the public. India has also subscribed to 
India the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where protection of privacy is safeguarded 
under its Article 12. With the support by the Courts, this acts as a deterrent factor for the digital 
lenders and encourages them to safeguard the personal data of its customers. Further, any 
aggrieved customer may have a recourse to seek redress through the Courts. 
In view of loan recovery, lenders are prohibited from harassing, badgering and coercing 
borrowers to repay their loans, and a such under regulation 12 (3) and are required to train their 
staff on these matters.20  Further, The Limitation Act 1963 (India) provides that one may recover 
their debt but if the time between the days the debt was issued and debt recovery is more than 
three years then the debt is automatically written off by law.21 This law is important for mobile 
lenders in India since they have to factor in this period to their business processes when handling 
issues of default. It is noted that in Kenya there is no regulation on writing-off of digital loans 
and the loans in default normally continue to accrue excessive rates of interest as discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
The final set of findings made in the review of the Indian fintech and mobile lending sectors 
related to specific regulations currently in operations as the basis for identifying regulatory 
approaches that may be relevant to Kenya. The fintech regulatory environment in India is based 
on four main elements which were digital payment ecosystem, data localization interoperability 
between wallets and an increase in minimum net worth requirements. It also includes changes 
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and standardization of know-your-customer rules. In addition it includes the inclusion of a 
regulatory sandbox.22 These main elements are discussed in detail herein under.  
A digital payment ecosystem refers to the collection of enabling technologies, laws and business 
practices that enable the existence of digital payment services. The inclusion of digital payment 
ecosystem in the regulatory framework for digital lending comes from the realization that digital 
payment loans rely on several sets of technologies that function on their own.  The relevant 
technologies span from telecommunications, mobile app development, and the internet, among 
others.  It is possible that all these elements fall under the jurisdiction of multiple regulators in 
India.  This ecosystem must be taken into account when designing a fintech regulatory 
framework to ensure that the regulations are in harmony with existing systems.  
On data localization, Indian regulations require that all critical data collected in the country is 
maintained within its borders.  This requirement by the Reserve Bank of India, takes into 
account India’s national security concerns. 23 It is comparable to recent efforts in Kenya that 
culminated in the enactment of the Data Protection Act 2019.24  India’s regulations also requires 
mobile wallet operators to have a minimum net worth of 50 million rupees, while in Kenya, 
there lacks any such requirements.25 Kenyan mobile lenders can be required to maintain a 
minimum capital structure similar to the capital requirements for commercial banks to ensure 
that the companies have stability. India also has strict know-your-customer rules in regards to 
its technology products that are seen to slow down mobile lending. The difference with Kenya 
is that local laws allow for digital identification of customers, which decreases the period within 
which a fintech firm can process a loan. This may be argued to be an example of how regulations 
may at times slow down business and innovation. 
The need to set up regulatory sandboxes in Kenya is underscored by their use in India. A 
regulatory sandbox is a setup that allows for regulators to test regulations using real-time data 
from players in the industry without imposing the actual regulations in a binding manner.26 
Regulatory sandboxes can be viewed as regulatory simulation designed to test the effect of 
regulatory activity in an industry before legalizing the regulatory initiatives.  Kenya can benefit 
from the institution of regulatory sandboxes for mobile lending in order to test how the market 
will react to various regulatory initiatives.  The sandbox allows for dynamic updates to the 
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regulations in ways that can also help the regulator understand the effect of its future actions in 
an experimental environment.  
India has in place a mechanism for the protection of consumer rights in the form of principles 
based charter titled “Charter of Consumers Rights” developed by the Reserve bank of India. 
The charter sets forth principles of customer protection in ways that allow fintech firms to make 
their own customized procedures and processes. The charter addresses the problem of 
overregulation by only discussing the principles of consumer protection to the exclusion of 
detailed prescriptions on procedural issues. Some of the key elements in the charter are right to 
fair treatment, right to transparency, fair and honest dealings, right to privacy, and a right to 
have customer grievance resolved. 27 This use of principles based approach is said to take care 
of the potential of regulations to stifle innovation since it does not provide highly prescriptive 
direction to the sector. 28 
In summary, the key lessons Kenya can learn from India are as follows. First, India has a clear 
regulator when it comes to mobile loan services. Kenya needs to get such clarity. India’s foray 
into regtech is also an important lesson in the implementation of regulatory activity for mobile 
lending since it’s a data dependent operation, and is hence easier to regulate with the input of 
data services. Advances in Peer to Peer lending in India makes it an important case for Kenya 
where Peer to peer lending is not yet com+7monplace. The dispute resolution mechanism used 
by the Indian Mobile lending regulator would be a welcome element in Kenya’s context where 
such mechanisms are absent. The use of regulatory sandboxes is also an important lesson for 
Kenya from India’s experience. 
3.3 Digital Lending Regulations in Nigeria  
Nigeria offers a unique viewpoint in as a far as regulation of mobile lending services is 
concerned. A review of literature related to Nigeria reveals that the country has made efforts to 
regulate mobile lending and the Central Bank of Nigeria is a central player in the development 
of the existing regulatory framework. The country offers an opportunity for the consideration 
of the similarities and differences between the Nigerian mobile lending regulatory ecosystem 
and the Kenyan one.  
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The key laws that anchor the regulatory framework in Nigeria include the Banks and other 
financial institutions Act (BOFIA) 1991 which has provided the legal basis for the Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN) to license and regulate the fintech sector, which  include digital lenders. 29 for 
a digital lending entity that wishes to provide marketplace lending services may do so by 
registering as a bank or Other Financial Institution (“OFI”).30  
In Nigeria, the CBN prescribes that it is only banks that have the legal mandate to handle 
financial transactions such as providing loans at interest.31 The mobile network operators are 
only involved as infrastructure providers, and as such have no money in the mobile lending 
platforms. However, the CBN has licensed other non-bank institutions to offer mobile loan 
services, and these fall under its regulatory purview. 32 This is different from the Kenyan 
situation where mobile lenders, once licensed to operate, do not need to work in conjunction 
with a bank to lend money to the public and they operate autonomously. 
In regulating the Nigerian mobile lending sector, The Central Bank of Nigeria has issued a set 
of guidelines specific to mobile money, which are updated periodically that cover the following 
ten areas. 33 These include; data management and privacy, product pricing disclosure, customer 
redress (dispute resolution mechanisms), consumer over-indebtedness, rates and pricing, 
systemic risk (relating to licensing and reporting), lending prohibition (for certain institutions), 
regulatory sandboxes, capital requirements and governance requirements. This is in contrast to 
the Kenyan context where mobile lenders have no unified regulator.  
There is also an aspect of self-regulation in the Nigerian fintech industry, with the establishment 
of the Fintech Association of Nigeria, a self-regulatory, not-for-profit and non-political 
organization incorporated to regulate companies in the fintech business. The association serves 
as a platform for the development of the fintech industry in Nigeria and a forum for the exchange 
of ideas by and between various stakeholders in the industry.34 The Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) also initiated the Payment System Vision 2020 to fast track the development of fintech 
in the country, which has encouraged the use of electronic payment methods. 
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In this regard, three central characteristics of the Nigerian mobile lending regulatory ecosystem 
are that only banks are allowed to lend and to manage financial transactions, the regulations in 
the country are made by the Central Bank of Nigeria, and the regulations are based on the need 
to ensure maintain the stability of the country’s financial system. 
With a view to curb cybercrime, the cybercrime (prohibition, prevention) Act 2015 was 
developed to step computer related crimes in the country and has found application in the digital 
lending sector. 35 Other noteworthy laws forming the legal framework for Nigerian fintech 
regulations are laws designed to deal with financial crime and include the Money laundering 
(prohibition) Act 201136 which addresses the risk of the use of financial technologies such as 
digital lending to perpetrate money laundering. The Terrorism (prevention) Act No. 10 of 2011 
also deals with offences that may arise from the use of fintech services for terrorism financing 
and in effect has implications for the conduct of digital lending.37 Based on the review, three 
key similarities were identified in literature between Kenyan and Nigerian mobile lending 
sectors. 
First, the emergence of mobile lending in Nigeria was in part driven by the demand for credit 
by individuals and SMEs, which was not being met by commercial banks. Just like the case in 
Kenya, SMEs were largely ignored by banks because of the higher cost of availing credit to 
them, which in turn led to the growth of micro lending activities such as digital lending.38  
The second similarity with Kenya is that Nigeria has a set of regulations and rules including 
specific guidelines developed by the Central Bank of Nigeria to govern the use of technology 
in financial services.  However, Nigeria has a more structured and systematic regulatory regime 
governing the mobile lending sector. The guidelines issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
address elements such as mobile money services, electronic payments, USSD, international 
money transfer, remittance services, and direct debit schemes. The Central Bank Nigeria took a 
more structured approach towards digital lending regulation as compared to the Kenyan case.  
Thirdly, it is quite clear that Nigeria is in the same position as Kenya whereby the rules for the 
mobile lending sector are created from existing laws and regulations to cover the operations of 
the fintech sector.  In the Kenyan case, the regulatory framework for the mobile lending sector 
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is composed of disparate regulations governing specific elements of mobile lending along its 
value chain, but with no specific legislation or regulations developed specifically for the digital 
sector. Nigeria goes one step further in developing specific guidelines applying to the sector as 
opposed to the case of Kenya where the players in the industry and left to their own devices in 
cases where no existing laws or regulations apply. 39 
The CBN is also actively aiming to improve the current fintech landscape. The CBN has 
proposed a licensing structure in its published draft Circular on the Exposure Draft of New CBN 
Licensing Regime (License Tiering) for Payment System Providers, which proposes a new 
licensing regime for all fintech companies and, if implemented, will properly position traditional 
banks to address emerging fintech-related issues with respect to: cyber risks; risk management 
framework; capital adequacy; better focused regulation; and oversight operations. 
The circular provides for the issuance of the following licensing structure that entails; a payment 
service provider (PSP) super license with a minimum capital requirement of N5 billion for a 
three-year period; a PSP standard license with a minimum capital base of N3 billion for a three-
year period; and a PSP basic license with a minimum capital base of N100 million for a two-
year period.40 The proposed licensing regime has received mixed reactions from fintech 
stakeholders, principally because of the onerous capital requirements which could make it 
difficult for some fintech companies to operate. 41In light of this feedback, the CBN is expected 
to issue new guidelines, which consider these concerns and find the right balance between 
protecting customers and creating non-stifling regulations.42 
The implementation of tighter regulatory controls in the Nigerian mobile lending sector has led 
to the following impacts. First, the relatively stricter mobile money regulatory environment in 
Nigeria is associated with lower levels of access to credit facilities by the market. It has been 
observed that a country such as Kenya, which has had a more relaxed approach to regulation, 
has seen better access to credit for underserved segments because of mobile money activity.43 
Kenya seems to have achieved higher rates of access to credit as a result of its more open 
approach to the mobile money transfer business since it allows mobile network operators to 
manage financial transactions.  It may well be the case that stricter regulations for mobile 
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network operators and digital lenders in Nigeria have limited their overall positive effect on 
access to credit for its citizens.44  It has been observed that countries where mobile money 
services are directed by mobile network operators such as in East Africa, there is better access 
to credit facilities, as compared to the situation in Nigeria where such services are bank-led.45   
In the Nigerian approach, mobile telecommunication companies serve as the interface between 
banks and lenders hence mobile network operators are only infrastructure providers and are not 
primarily in the business of offering the mobile loans. This complicates cost assignment and 
determination of margins by the players. In contrast, the Kenyan situation is such that mobile 
network operators have their own businesses but carry out money transfer services quite 
independently from banks. The second impact of this approach by Nigeria to regulation may be 
a much slower pace of innovation. This is brought about by limiting the options available to 
businesses that may have been interested in participating in the mobile money sector. In the 
overall, it is clear that there is a tradeoff to be made between encouraging innovation and 
maintaining sanity in the digital lending sector.46 
The Nigerian Central Bank is considering changes to its rules to allow for telecoms to also offer 
services that were previously reserved for Banks.  In this plan, Telecommunications companies 
will now be known as payment banking services (PBS) and will be allowed to offer most 
traditional banking services via their telecommunication systems. 47 This should lead to more 
innovation in the Nigerian mobile lending sector. 
On a positive aspect, Nigerian courts have provided clarity around online transactions and they 
have recognized electronic signatures and the resultant electronic contracts as valid.  In the case 
of Misore & Anor v. Aregbesola & Others. (2015) 7 SCM 92 at 157, the Court recognized 
online contracts executed through an e-signature as valid and enforceable.  It was held that a 
valid electronic signature may be proved in any manner, including by showing that a procedure 
existed by which it is necessary for a person, in order to proceed further with a transaction, to 
have executed a symbol or security procedure for the purpose of verifying that an electronic 
record is that of the person. This position is supported by Section 93(3) of the Evidence Act of 
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Nigeria.48 This interpretation therefore provides the clarity on whether mobile loans are legally 
enforceable contracts and it renders them valid.  
In summary, the key lessons that Kenya can learn from Nigeria in the quest for setting up a 
fitting regulatory regime are as follow. First, Nigeria, just like India have a very clear regulator 
of the fintech sector which includes mobile lending, which is the Central Bank of Nigeria. This 
clarity is noteworthy. The use of guidelines in regulations can also be seen as a flexible approach 
to regulation since an Act of parliament would be more difficult to adjust with the changing 
times. Kenya will do well to avoid the bottlenecks introduced by failing to allow network 
operators to run mobile lending businesses since this has reduced innovation and the motivation 
of these firms to invest in mobile lending.  
3.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, some issues have been observed in the quest to compare Kenyan mobile lending 
regulatory framework to those of India and Nigeria. In India, it was observed that the country 
has a more stringent regulatory philosophy and government control over the financial sector is 
much stronger compared Kenya, with the Indian government having the power to issue 
instructions to the Indian Central Bank. Some of the key differences between India’s and 
Kenya’s mobile lending framework is that India has peer to peer lending approaches while in 
Kenya, the money lent to users comes from the lending company. Most of the technologies 
supporting digital lending are similar.  
The Nigerian situation is such that the Central Bank is fully in charge of digital lending since 
only banks are allowed to lend. Banks use telecommunication infrastructure from mobile 
telephone firms to offer digital lending services. In this case, Nigeria’s Central Bank has 
maintained control over the digital lending space since the laws in the country are interpreted to 
prohibit lending by anyone other than a bank. It was observed that Nigeria’s mobile lending 
market is not as well developed and this is attributed to throttling by the regulatory framework. 
Based on the findings in this Chapter, the key aspects that Kenya can borrow shall be 
presented in Chapter 4. 
                                                 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
4.1 Introduction  
This study sought to bring out the case for regulation in the digital lending sector in Kenya. This 
was based on the concern that the lack of a regulatory framework has led to detrimental effects 
to lenders and to the goal of financial inclusion in general. As such the study sought to look at 
the fintech sector and based on the findings, to provide a basis for instituting a regulatory 
framework for the digital lending sector. The first chapter addressed the conceptual issues 
relation to the study including consideration of background information, the adoption of a 
theoretical framework, and the adoption of a research methodology. The second chapter 
addressed itself to the regulatory framework governing digital lending in Kenya. This included 
a review of the laws with a regulatory dimension touching on digital lending, as well as the 
practices of digital lenders in Kenya. The third chapter compared the legal and regulatory 
framework for digital lending in Nigeria and India. This chapter presents a summary of the key 
findings of the study, the importance of these findings, the limitations of the study, the 
recommendations for legal and policy changes as well as recommendations for further studies.  
4.2 Findings of the Research  
Three research questions were used in the effort to respond to the objective of the study. The 
first research question was, what is the current regulatory framework available to digital 
lending? In this regard, it was established that there are no specific laws enacted in Kenya for 
the purposes of governing the digital lending sector. It is also the case that no amendments have 
been made to the existing laws to effectively regulate digital lending. While it may be argued 
that it may not be necessary to have specific laws for each sector, the scale and scope of the 
services offered by digital lenders is such that the sector can have an adverse effect on the 
economy of the country due to the sheer volume of money disbursed by the sector.  
The second research question was, how does lack of regulation contribute to exploitative lending 
practices by digital lenders in Kenya? It was established that the very absence of sector specific 
regulations makes it possible for digital lenders to find creative ways of circumventing financial 
sector best practices which in this case are not legally binding to them. This has resulted in some 
of them adopting exploitative lending practices as discussed in Chapter 1 and 2 of this study. 
Apart from laws that would provide specific direction on how players in the sector ought to 
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conduct themselves, there also lacks any statement of violations with specific sanctions 
applicable to the digital lending sector. While there are specific legal offences applicable to 
lenders which are stated in laws such as the Banking Act for institutions governed by the act, 
these violations are not applicable across the board. As a result, matters such as the in duplum 
rule do not apply to digital lenders and some of them have therefore charged exorbitant interests 
to vulnerable borrowers. The lack of express prohibitions with specific sanctions has therefore 
made it possible for digital lenders to act in ways considered illegal by other players in the 
financial services industry.   
Further, the absence of express redress mechanisms supported by the law for the sector presents 
a difficulty for aggrieved consumers to find redress. Most borrowers are not sophisticated 
individuals who are financially capable of instituting legal proceedings against digital lenders 
when they feel that their rights have been violated. In the current context, any borrower who 
feels aggrieved must go to court and seek appropriate remedies, whilst in other sectors, there 
are regulators who can receive and process complaints from aggrieved parties and punish the 
offenders through penalties provided under the sector specific laws. In this case, lack of a legally 
instituted redress mechanism encourages the digital lending companies to take advantage and 
engage in exploitative lending practices.  
The third research question was; what lessons from other jurisdictions on regulations be used to 
improve digital lending practices in Kenya. The main findings were as follows; first, both 
Nigeria and India have a specific fintech regular, with a clear mandate over digital lending in 
their jurisdictions. The Indian Reserve Bank and the Central Bank of Nigeria has clearly spelt 
out mandates in the two countries. The presence of a specific regulator who monitors the 
operations of the various industry players has the effect of maintaining sanity in the sector.  
Secondly, there are stronger customer protections regimes in India that ensure the rights of the 
consumers are upheld and they as a result minimize the legal hazards that customers in those 
countries face. For instance, India’s charter of Customer rights directly addresses the principles 
that digital lenders are expected to implement in regards to digital lending. In the Nigerian case, 
digital lenders are in fact banks and hence customers enjoy the protections given to them through 
the Banks and other financial institutions Act (2004). It should be noted that in Kenya, the 
consumers enjoy some protections covered by other laws and regulations with crosscutting 
jurisdictions, but the challenge is such regulators only handle a specific element of business 
operations, such as the Competition Authority, and the Data Protection Authority. This leaves 
gaps in the protections specifically afforded to digital lending customers. 
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The third lessons Kenyan can learn from Nigeria and India is on proportionality of the regulatory 
framework with respect to innovation. While the two jurisdictions have elaborate regulatory 
frameworks for their fintech sectors, it is also the case that Nigeria’s fintech sector is lagging 
behind and not as well developed as Kenya’s. This has been attributed to the stifling effect of 
regulations on innovation as discussed earlier. In this case, the absence of restrictive regulations 
in Kenya has allowed more space for the digital lending sector to grow since players can 
innovate on their products to find business models that work. The lesson then is that regulations 
must be crafted carefully to avoid stifling innovation and the growth of the sector because of its 
importance in creating access to credit facilities.   
The study also found two concepts that would be useful in the development of regulations for 
the digital lending sector in Kenya. These are setting up of regulatory sandboxes and secondly, 
the use of principles based approach to the development of regulations such as the Indian Charter 
of Customer Rights. A principles based approach to regulation in the case of the digital lending 
sector would mean relying on existing laws and practices in the development of sector specific 
regulations. This would mean that principles found in laws such as the Consumer Protection 
Act, The Data Protection Act, And The Banking Act, the to the extent that they are applicable 
to the sector, would be used as the general principles for the regulatory framework for the fintech 
sector. This approach takes care of the potential of regulations to stifle innovation since it does 
not provide highly prescriptive direction to the sector. The Indian Charter of Customer Rights 
illustrates this point effectively as it sets forth principles of customer protection in ways that 
allow fintech firms to make their own customized procedures and processes. The use of 
regulatory sandboxes in India is also idea that can help in the development of regulation where 
there is no pressure on the players to comply to proposed regulations, but provides both the 
players and regulators real world circumstances to help analyze the effect of a given regulation 
before it is instituted. This approach would be very useful in emerging sectors such as the 
Kenyan fintech sector.  
4.3 Importance of the findings 
These findings have helped to identify some of the inadequacies in the existing regulatory 
framework of the digital lending space in Kenya. In particular, policy makers can utilize the 
findings of this study as a foundation for development of specific policies to support the 




Some options will require changes to the law, or the enactment of new ones, while some are 
only administrative especially where existing regulations are applied to the digital lending 
sector.  
4.4  Recommendations  
Based on the findings made by this study, the following are the recommendations made; 
3.4.1. Establishment of a specific regulator 
A specific regulator for the digital lending sector needs to be appointed. This can either be done 
by the enactment of a fintech statute, or by assigning the role to one of the existing regulators 
in the financial services sector. In the first option, the creation of an office of a digital lender 
regulator would entail deployment of resources and build capacity to understand new 
technologies, the business models and their implications on the market and on regulation. This 
may not be ideal due to the cost implication on deployment of resources. 
In the second option, the supervision of the lenders will rely on the framework and mandates 
already in place for the financial sector supervision. In this case the best placed regulators to 
oversee the sector are the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) or the Microfinance Unit based in the 
ministry of finance.   
The key challenge in regulating the digital lenders is the technological and innovative nature of 
their products and services that require the technical know-how. The appointed regulator should 
have a Digital Lenders’ Supervision Department that will have adequate resources to undertake 
frequent research on the operations of the digital lending market in order to understand the 
associated risks and create regulation that addresses the risks. The regulator should also exercise 
oversight over the various digital lenders and keenly monitor their operations.  
3.4.2. Legislative amendments to incorporate digital lending services 
Some changes to existing laws are recommended to expand the mandate of the laws to increase 
the impact of regulations in the fintech sector. Once the chosen regulator is appointed, the CBK 
Act or the Microfinance Act as above, would have to be amended to define digital loans and 
digital lenders and to include them under the scope of the chosen act of parliament. 
The proposals on other amendments are as follows; The Companies Act to be amended to 
require digital lenders to get authorization from an appointed regulator before registration. There 
should be stringent licensing requirements to ensure that the entities that get approved for 
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registration have met the minimum threshold which should include a minimum deposit to be 
held with the CBK. 
 The Microfinance Act should be amended to expand the definition of a microfinance company 
to include digital lenders. This will require the development of enabling regulations under the 
Act. The regulations should address the key issues arising on the reported digital lending 
practices. Of utmost importance is regulations that prescribe the interest rates to be charged on 
loans and penalties for their loans including the need to restrict the penalty interest chargeable 
to a certain amount, the same way as the in duplum rule that was discussed in Chapter 2. The 
regulations should also provide for compliance with consumer protection principles and there 
should be parameters set for acceptable debt collection practices. 
Further, the functional approach to regulation that is applied in the financial services industry 
in Kenya can be maintained, where there will exist different regulators for each function 
undertaken. To achieve this, the acts of parliament with a regulatory interest in the fintech sector 
should be enhanced to expressly include digital lending services. The Acts include the 
Consumer Protection Act, the Data Protection Act and the Competition Act. The implication of 
the amendments would be to provide clarity and certainty on the applicability of the provisions 
in those acts to digital lenders.  
There also should be a memorandum of understanding to promote collaborative efforts by the 
various enforcement agencies under the above acts to support digital lending. Some areas of 
cooperation which could enhance the efficiency of the sector would include joint inspections of 
digital lenders, sharing of risk assessment tests, joint financial literacy campaigns and public 
education, and collaboration in research to help identify and understand an appropriate and 
proportionate regulatory approach to fintech. 
3.4.3. Self-regulation through the Digital Lenders Association of Kenya (DLAK) 
As discussed in Chapter 2, self-regulation may be preferred over state regulation especially in 
instances where regulation is on technical and highly specialized issues. As digital lending and 
its associated risks are technologically driven, the industry players can utilize their expertise in 
formulating regulation that is flexible and is rapidly able to adapt to technological changes. 
It is recommended that the Digital Lenders Association of Kenya (DLAK) be recognised in law 
within the context of newly developed laws and regulations. With the creation of an underlying 
52 
 
legislation, the entity will obtain a stronger legal position along the same lines as the laws giving 
mandate to the LSK and ICPAK. 
For self-regulation to be effective, DLAK should be mandated to exercise some direct oversight 
responsibility over the digital lenders. Further, DLAK should be subject to the oversight of the 
regulator in this case CBK or the Microfinance Unit in the Ministry of Finance, and it should 
observe standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising its powers and delegated 
responsibilities. 
The Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) should facilitate sectoral stakeholder forums aimed at 
exchanging knowledge and enhancing the regulator’s technical knowledge and understanding 
of the innovations and business models which in turn facilitates communication by the regulator 
on its expectations and concerns. 
The key challenge with self-regulation is the potential for conflict of interest as a result of access 
by DLAK to valuable information about digital lenders. The appointed regulator should ensure 
that there is management of conflict of interest through regulations and a conflict of interest 
policy should be created to ensure frequent declarations by the SRO. To ensure compliance 
there should be provisions made for inspections and surveillance by the regulator to ensure 
compliance with the set standards. The regulator should set strict sanctions and have 
enforcement powers to ensure strict compliance by the SRO. 
3.4.4. Use of regulatory Sandboxes 
It is also recommended that the process of developing regulations include the use of regulatory 
sandboxes by the appointed regulator to ensure that regulations do not stifle innovation. This is 
through lessons learnt from the Indian context where the market players are exposed to any 
proposed regulation for purposes of interaction and giving feedback on the proposed law before 
it becomes binding.  To that end, the proposed regulations for digital lenders should first be 
released in a non-binding manner to facilitate interaction and feedback by the players. 
For the sandbox to be effective, there should be clear objectives and challenges that are being 
addressed by the sandbox. It is recommended that the appointed regulator, be it CBK or the 
Microfinance Unit, should formulate guidelines by on the minimum regulatory requirements for 
the participants in the sandbox testing, for instance in this case participants should be digital 
lenders who are legally incorporated as companies and have a minimum of 2 years in operations 
in order to utilise their expertise feedback. Further, there should be a clear procedure for 
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revocation or suspension of approvals to participate in the regulatory sandbox at any time before 
the end of the test period and the regulator should have the legal mandate to take enforcement 
action against a participant who breaches the set regulatory requirements.  
The challenge in use of regulatory sandboxes may be regulatory arbitrariness where there may 
be the impression that the regulator is giving unfair advantage to selected lenders to the 
detriment of the others during the testing of the proposed regulation. To mitigate against this, 
there should be transparency and clear and documented criteria for any decisions reached. 
3.4.5. Use of principles based approach to regulation. 
Based on the lessons learnt from India, the use of principles based approach takes care of the 
potential of regulations to stifle innovation since it does not provide highly prescriptive direction 
to the sector. It will entail the reliance of existing laws and practices in the development of sector 
specific regulations. In the Kenyan Context, this would mean that principles found in laws such 
as the Consumer Protection Act, The Data Protection Act, Competition Act and The Banking 
Act, to the extent that they are applicable to the sector, would be used as the general principles 
for the regulatory framework for the fintech sector. The regulations to be formulated should 
expressly provide that the above principles are applicable and the lenders should therefore 
comply, failing which strict sanctions in the above acts will apply. 
As earlier discussed, the rule based approach to regulation of innovation is not ideal due to its 
relative inflexibility and prescriptive nature. Due to the rapid and evolving nature of technology 
products, the rules may be rendered obsolete and they require constant review and amendments. 
It is therefore recommended that the approach to be used in digital lenders regulation should be 
the principle based approach. 
To address the key challenge of uncertainty of what the regulator expects in terms of compliance 
in principle based regulation, the regulator should combine the outlined principles with 
elaboration in the form of guidance and minimal expectation as opposed to more detailed rules.  
In enforcement, the regulator should also apply consistency in its decisions so as to form certain 
precedents for the rest of the lenders in the industry. 
When drafting regulations that have a cross border impact, policymakers and regulators, both at 
the national and international level, must work towards sound regulatory solutions that are in 
line with their public policy interests, and harmonized with its international partners in a way 
that boosts access to global markets and expands the benefits of digital trade. Policymakers 
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should ensure that their regulations are in line with the agreed international principles and 
standards, for ease of compliance for corporates like Safaricom that have an international 
presence.  
Recommendations for further research are as follows; further research into the effectiveness of 
principle based regulations is needed to assess their effectiveness in light of the inter-sectorial 
nature of innovation driven by advances in technology. Secondly, based on the negative impact 
that regulation has had on the growth of the Nigerian digital lending sector, there is a need for 
further research into the impact of regulations on innovation. 
4.5 Final Conclusion 
In this study is has been demonstrated that there are existing inadequacies in regulatory 
framework of the digital lending sector in Kenya. While it is the case that digital lending as an 
activity is not clearly referenced in law, there are still many relevant laws that apply to the sector. 
The challenge is that the laws were not designed to handle the eventualities of digital lending 
which has become a significant source of debt for low income households and small businesses. 
The current situation therefore is that the existing laws are not optimized in ways that offer the 
best protections for consumers and in addition, there lacks a common body that ensures all the 
relevant laws are applied. The study has proposed measures to seal these gaps through a 
common regulator and an enabling system of laws, but has also pointed out that the regulations 
should be introduced with some care through the use of regulatory sandboxes to ensure that 
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At the point of submitting this dissertation for examination in February 2020, there was no 
specific bill or law seeking to specifically regulate the digital lenders. On 19th June 2020, the 
Central Bank of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2020, was published.   
The principal object of the bill is to amend the Central Bank of Kenya Act in order to ensure 
that the Central Bank of Kenya obtains the legal mandate to regulate the conduct of providers 
of digital financial products and services as well as financial products and services.  
The bill recognizes that there is currently no legal framework governing digital lenders and it 
proposes to amend Section 4 of the Central Bank Act to enhance the mandate of the CBK to 
include regulation of the digital lenders. The bill is still under discussion and there are currently 
no draft regulations. If the bill is passed into law, the CBK shall then proceed to formulate the 
regulations which are expected to address the gaps in the digital lending framework that have 
been discussed in detail in this paper.  
There will also be need for further research to assess the adequacy of the legal framework 
governing digital lending services in Kenya, once the bill is passed into law. 
